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Summary findings
Deregulation  of the U.S. natural  gas industry  has been  Introducing  open  access to interstate  pipelines  and
under  way  since the  late  1970s.  The industry  was  their  unbundling  from  gas sales has allowed  end users  to
deregulated  to create  competitive  markets  in natural  gas  participate  in the  efficiency  gains in upstream  markets.
and  its pipeline  transportation,  in the expectation  that  All this has contributed  to declining  retail  prices  for all
competition  would  guide transactions  toward  a more  major  consumer  categories.
efficient  outcome.  Deregulation  is far from  complete,  however.  Current
Juris  provides  an overview  of the  deregulation  process  regulation  of interstate  pipeline  companies  and the
and  its effect  on the  development  and  functioning  of  secondary  transportation  market  does  not  promote
natural  gas and gas transportation  markets  in the United  efficient  allocation  of transportation  contracts.  Flexible
States.  He  analyzes  the  tradinig of pipeline  capacity  in  pricing  of transportation  contracts  should  be introduced
primary  and secondary  markets  and  the regulation  of  in both  the  primary  and secondary  transportation
pipeline  transportation,  identifies  mechanisms  that  markets.
pipeline  companies  use to coordinate  bilateral  .But deregulation  of retail  markets  remains  the most
transactions,  and summarizes  deregulation's  main  important  task  and the biggest  challenge  facing  industry
achievements  in the  U.S. natural  gas industry.  regulators.  Small-volume  end users  (such  as residential  or
Industry  achievements  in the  past  15 years show  that  co.mmercial  customers)  are captive  to local  distriubtion
expectations  were  not  unrealistic.  The  United  States  utilities,  without  access to competitive  wholesale
enjoys  a highly competitive  wholesale  natural  gas market  markets.  All end  users should  be able to choose  a natural
and an increasingly  competitive  interstate  transportation  gas supplier  and receive  natural  gas at the  minimum  cost
market.  Both  markets  have benefited  from  the  to  society.
deregulation  of natural  gas production  and marketing
and  the liberalization  of natural  gas prices.
This paper  - a product  of the Private  Participation  in Infrastructure  Group,  Private  Secto-  Development  Department  -
is part  of a larger  effort  in the department  to analyze  issues arising  from  private  participation  in infrastructure.  Copies  of
the paper  are available  free from the World  Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact  Sandra Vivas,
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The deregulation of the natural gas industry in the United States has given free rein to
market forces in most  of the industry. The main goal of deregulation was to liberalize
natural  gas  trading  and  supply, the  industry  segments with  the  greatest  potential  to
operate  as  competitive  markets.  Another  major  goal  was  to  improve  the  regulatory
oversight of pipeline transportation, which is dominated by natural monopolies.
The wholesale natural gas market became the target of radical liberalization. Natural gas
prices were liberalized, entry to the market was deregulated, and pipeline transportation
was  unbundled  from  natural  gas  sales.  These measures  helped  create  a  competitive
wholesale market. In pipeline transportation, economic regulation has gradually moved
away from direct price setting to price flexibility, to allow pipeline companies to adjust
more  readily  to  changing  market  conditions.  Deregulation  has  greatly  benefited  the
participants in the U.S. natural gas industry.
This  paper  examines  the  development  and  functioning  of  natural  gas  and  gas
transportation  markets  in  the  United  States.  It  first  provides  an  overview  of  the
deregulation  of  the  U.S.  natural  gas  industry,  then  looks  at  market  structure,  the
organization of trading, and contracting practices in the natural gas market. It analyzes the
trading  of pipeline  capacity in  primary and  secondary markets  and the  regulation  of
pipeline transportation.  It  then  identifies mechanisms that  pipeline  companies  use  to
coordinate the many bilateral transactions in  natural gas and transportation markets  in
order to optimize pipeline transportation in the deregulated natural gas industry. Finally it
summarizes the main achievements of deregulation of the U.S. natural gas industry.
Deregulation and Structural Changes
The  U.S.  natural  gas  industry  has  gone  through  a  complete  cycle  of  government
intervention during the past  60 years. During the first several decades the gas industry
enjoyed only limited oversight by the government. Then came the Natural  Gas Act of
1938,  which  established  a  basis  for  regulating  gas  prices  and  the  activities  of  gas
companies.  Regulation  gradually  tightened  over  the  next  forty  years.  Interstate
transactions  - those  between  participants  in  two  different  states  - came  under
regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Intrastate transactions
came under regulation by state public utility commissions.
Heavy regulation produced poor results. Low wellhead prices discouraged exploration for
and  production  of  natural  gas.  Transportation  and  distribution  markets  became
monopolized.  The retail  prices  of natural  gas  were  distorted  and  did  not  reflect  its
economic value. All this generated large inefficiencies in all segments of the gas industry
and  imposed  high  costs  on  consumers.  A  wave  of  gas  shortages  in  the  late  1970s
prompted a search for new ways to regulate the gas industry - ways that would allow
more room for decentralized transactions among industry participants.
Deregulation of the U.S. natural gas industry in the past 20 years has focused primarily
on interstate gas transactions. Since the major producing and consuming regions  in the5
United States are separated by several state borders, deregulation of interstate gas
transactions had a major impact on the operation and efficiency of the  natural gas
industry. The deregulation  of such transactions  started  in 1978, when Congress  adopted
the Natural Gas Policy Act authorizing  FERC  to liberalize  interstate  natural gas markets.
In  1989 Congress approved  legislation liberalizing wellhead gas prices, and in  1992
legislation  freeing  up interstate  natural gas transactions.  And during the 1980s and 1990s
FERC introduced  executive  orders  that gradually  established  a framework  for the actions
of market  forces in the natural  gas industry.'
Regulatory  change
Among  the regulatory  measures,  FERC  Orders  No. 436 of 1985  and No. 636 of 1992 had
the greatest  impact on how the natural gas industry  operates.  By Order No. 436, FERC
instituted an open access regime for interstate pipeline transportation. This  regime
enabled  local distribution  utilities and large end users to bypass pipeline companies' gas
sales and purchase  natural gas directly  from producers.  Although  the open access regime
was voluntary  for pipeline  companies,  it was widely accepted  because  it enabled  them to
increase  the utilization  of pipelines.  But large-scale  implementation  took place only after
FERC resolved the issue of how the costs of the transition to open access were to be
distributed.
Before 1985 pipeline companies  concluded  long-term  take-or-pay  supply contracts with
gas producers  to secure gas supply for distribution  utilities  and end users. Order No. 436
allowed these customers  to exit from long-term supply contracts, but left the pipeline
companies with large take-or-pay obligations to producers. Pipeline companies were
hesitant  to implement  the open access  regime  until FERC  Order No. 500 allowed  them to
pass a share of the transition  costs  to procurers,  distribution  utilities,  and end users.
Order No. 436 was followed  by the Wellhead  Decontrol  Act of 1989,  which deregulated
the wholesale  price of natural gas in all interstate  transactions.  This legislation  freed gas
producers from the burden of regulation and promoted competition in the wholesale
natural gas market.
Order No. 636 introduced  the most radical  regulatory  change  in the gas industry since  the
beginning  of regulation  in 1938. The order required  pipeline companies  to unbundle,  or
separate, natural gas sale operations from pipeline transportation  activities and set up
separate  transportation  and trading affiliates.  This supported  the development  of natural
gas marketing,  which was deregulated  and opened  to competition.  The deregulated  prices
of  natural gas attracted many new companies into marketing and promoted fierce
competition  among  marketing  firms.
' Major legislative  and executive  measures  were the Wellhead  Decontrol  Act of 1989,  the Energy  Policy
Act of 1992,  and FERC  Orders  No. 380,436, 500, 636, and 577. For more informnation  see Pierce 1988  and
De Vany  and Walls  1995,  or U.S. Department  of Energy 1995a.6
Order  No.  636  also  reformed  the  regulation  of  interstate  pipeline  transportation  to
promote fair rates and minimize regulatory distortion of natural gas prices. And it allowed
resale of transportation contracts by shippers. That led to the development of a secondary
transportation market, where shippers can purchase pipeline capacity from other shippers
that  have  temporarily  or  permanently  spare  capacity.  The  secondary  transportation
market,  known  as  the  capacity  release  market,  promotes  efficient  allocation  of
transportation contracts among shippers and high utilization of natural gas pipelines.
Order No.  636 was followed by a series of measures by FERC that were  designed to
promote  competition  in  the  natural  gas  market  and  increase  flexibility  in  pipeline
transportation. FERC issued orders and proposals to increase transparency and flexibility
in  short-term capacity resale,  allow shippers choice in  delivery locations  on interstate
pipeline  systems,  and  promote  the  standardization of  contracts  and  pipeline  system
operation. FERC works with gas industry representatives in formulating new regulatory
measures,  helping  to  ensure  that  the  measures  adopted  broadly  benefit  industry
participants.  FERC is now focusing on the development of a  short-term transportation
market  where  short-term  capacity  and  interruptible  contracts  can  be  traded  among
pipeline  companies  and  shippers.  This  market  will  lead to  more  efficient  pricing  of
transportation  services  and  enable  pipeline  companies  to  sell  unsubscribed  pipeline
capacity.
Structural change
Deregulation has changed the structure of the gas industry in the United States. Before
1985 the industry was vertically separated into production, pipeline transportation, and
distribution  (figure 1). But with  all transactions tightly regulated and completed under
long-term  contracts,  the  industry  was  de  facto  vertically  integrated.  Distribution
companies could not choose a pipeline company unless their long-term supply contract
expired.  Most  marketed  production  was  sold  under  long-term  take-or-pay  contracts
between producers  and pipeline companies. So little competition  occurred among gas
producers despite the large number concentrated in several large producing areas along
the Gulf Coast and in West Texas.
Figure 1 Traditional Structure of the U.S. Gas Industry, before 1985
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The introduction of open access to interstate pipeline transportation in  1985 limited the
use of long-term contracts and introduced competition to the wholesale gas market (figure
2).  Gas  marketing  emerged  as  a  new  segment  of  the  natural  gas  industry.  Local7
distribution  companies  and  large  end  users  with  direct  connections  to  the  interstate
pipelines  started to contract natural gas directly from producers. Many large end  users
constructed  new connecting pipelines to bypass local  distribution companies  and  gain
access to the wholesale market. The unbundling of interstate pipeline transportation  in
1992 completed  the transformation  of the  wholesale market  into  a  fully  competitive
market (figure 3). Buyers of natural gas benefited, as average wellhead prices dropped by
11 percent in real terms between 1988 and 1994.
Figure  2  Structure  of  the  U.S.  Gas  Industry  with  Open  Access  to  Pipeline
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Tigure  3 Structure of the U.S. Gas Industry after Unbundling of Sales from Pipeline
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suchcasoelectsandinustl  ctomes,  a  Producers  ~~  companiestrial
r_Marketers 
F -- ~~~~~~~  -- v  - - ;  --- 
Gas  trasportation  Bypass  Pipeline  - - - Gas Waes
The retail market has also experienced the introduction of open access and unbundling,
but progress in deregulation differs from state to  state. Typically, only large end users,
such as electric utilities and industrial customers, are eligible for open access to interstate8
pipelines.  These customers have benefited a great deal from the deregulated wholesale
gas market. 2 Between 1988 and 1994 the average real price paid by industrial consumers
and electric utilities decreased by  15 percent and  19 percent (table  1). Small end users
(commercial and residential users) remain captive to local distribution companies because
their annual consumption is below the eligibility threshold for open access. 3 These end
users saw a decline of only 3 percent in the real average price they paid for natural gas
deliveries between 1988 and 1994.
Table  1 Average Natural  Gas Prices and Price Changes,  1988 and 1994
(1994 dollars per thousand cubic feet)
Category  1988  1994  Percentage change
Wellhead  2.05  1.83  -11
City gate  3.54  3.08  -13
End use
Residential  6.64  6.41  -3
Commercial  5.62  5.43  -3
On-system industriala  3.58  3.05  -15
Electric utility  2.83  2.28  -19
a. On-system sales are sales of natural gas to the end users by a local distribution utility.
Source: U.S. Department of Energy 1995b.
Natural  Gas Market
In  the  now  competitive  wholesale  gas  market  trading  takes  place  through  bilateral
decentralized transactions among producers, marketers, local distribution companies, and
large end users. Trading has become concentrated in spot markets organized by a number
of market centers in producing regions and consumer areas. These spot markets generate
efficient price signals about the market value of natural gas, instantly reacting to actual
and expected changes in supply and demand.
Deregulation of the gas industry has facilitated the separation of physical and financial
trading. Gas market participants minimize supply risks by balancing their demand with
gas  supply contracts  in the  short and long  term. They minimize price  risk by  taking
financial positions on their gas supply contract portfolio. As a result, two distinct markets
have developed in the wholesale natural gas market in the United States: a physical gas
market, where contracts for physical natural gas delivery are traded, and a financial gas
market, where contracts for price risk management are traded.
2 Electric  utilities  and industrial  customers  purchased  73 percent  and 76 percent  of total gas  deliveries  in
the wholesale  market in 1995. They  use local distribution  companies  primarily  as transporters  of natural
gas  from  an  upstream  gas  market  to their  consumption  site.
3  Commercial  consumers  purchased  about 23 percent  of total consumption  in the wholesale  market,  while
residential  customers  purchased  almost  exclusively  from local distribution  companies  in 1995.9
Natural gas supply  and deliveries
The natural gas market in the United States is the largest in the world, with a supply of
24.3  trillion  cubic  feet  in  1995. Almost  77  percent  of  this  supply  was  produced
domestically  in  1995. The rest  came from  storage withdrawals and  imports,  each of
which  accounted for  12 percent.  Gas production  is concentrated in  a large producing
region along the Gulf Coast in Louisiana and Texas; smaller producing regions  are in
Alaska, the Southwest, and the central United States. Imports from Canada provide an
important share of gas supply in consumer areas in the Northeast, the Midwest, and the
Pacific Northwest.
Natural gas goes primarily to consumption (89 percent in 1995) and additions to storage
(11 percent). Natural gas exports are minimal (table 2).
Table 2 Supply and Disposition of Natural Gas in the United States, 1995
Volume (millions of cubic feet)  Percentage of total
Supply
Domestic dry production  18,708,969  76.85
Withdrawals from storage  3,024,548  12.42
Imports  2,841,048  11.67
Balancing item  -230,002  -0.94
Total  24,344,563  100.00
Disposition
Additions to storage  2,609,779  10.72
Exports  154,119  0.63
Consumption  21,580,665  88.65
Total  24,344,563  100.00
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration.
Total consumption by end users was 19.7 trillion cubic feet in  1995 (table 3). There are
four main categories of consumers: industrial (which accounted for 44 percent of total
consumption  in  1995),  residential  (25  percent),  electric  utilities  (16  percent),  and
commercial (15 percent).  Consumption increased steadily between  1930 and the early
1970s, from 1.2 trillion cubic feet to almost 20 trillion cubic feet in 1973. It plummeted
during the oil crisis in the late 1970s and early  1980s, but then began increasing again
during the past seven years as a result of growth in consumption by industrial consumers
and electric utilities (figure 4).10
Table 3 Average Prices and Deliveries of Natural Gas to U.S. Consumers, 1995
Average price  Deliveries  Deliveries as a
Consumer category  (dollars per 1,000 cubic feet)  (millions of cubic feet)  percentage of total
Residential  6.06  4,850,318  24.7
Commercial  5.05  3,031,077  15.4
Industrial  2.71  8,579,585  43.6
Electric utilities  2.02  3,196,507  16.3
Vehicle fuel  - 2,674  0.01
Total  3.79  19,660,161  100
- Not available.
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration.
The average price of natural gas increased dramatically between 1970 and 1984 but has
been steadily decreasing since then (figure 5). Price increases before 1984 were caused by
increasing demand for natural gas, price rigidity imposed by regulation, and the impact of
the oil crisis. Deregulation and increasing competition in the wholesale gas market have
pushed wholesale and some retail prices down since 1985.
Large end users have benefited from the introduction of open access and the unbundling
of interstate pipeline transportation. These reforms have enabled them to participate in the
cost  savings achieved through  competition in the wholesale gas market.  The nominal
average prices of natural gas at the wellhead and at large end users'  consumption sites
decreased dramatically between 1984 and  1995. The average wellhead price  fell from
$2.66 per thousand cubic feet in 1984 to $1.55 in 1995. The average retail price paid by
industrial consumers decreased from $4.22 per thousand cubic feet in  1984 to  $2.71 in
1995, and that paid by electric utilities from $3.70 to $2.02 (see table 3).
Small end users have also benefited from deregulation of the gas industry, but their gains
have been much smaller, mainly because of their limited choice in supply. Most small
end users remain  captive to the  local distribution  company. State regulation of  retail
prices has allowed only limited transfer of cost savings from the wholesale market to
small users.
The average retail price paid by small end users declined between 1984 and 1988 but then
increased again. Commercial and residential users paid on average $5.55 and $6.12 per
one thousand cubic feet in 1984. In 1988 average prices bottomed at $4.63 and $5.47 per
one thousand cubic feet. Then they rose again, peaking above the 1984 levels in 1994. In
1995 commercial and residential users paid on average $5.05 and $6.06 per one thousand
cubic feet.
Retail prices  of natural  gas vary  widely across the United  States. Consumers  in  the
Northeast  and  Southeast tend to  face the highest prices, while those  in the  Midwest,11
Pacific Northwest, and Southwest enjoy relatively low prices. Regional price differences
reflect differences in the source of natural gas supply, proximity to  producing regions,
availability of pipeline capacity, and state regulatory regime. The Northeast is relatively
far from major producing regions and, together with Florida, lacks the pipeline capacity
to bring more natural gas from the Gulf of Mexico. Louisiana and Texas are both major
natural gas producing states, while Illinois and California import large quantities of low-
priced natural gas from Canada (figure 6).
Physical gas market
The physical wholesale gas market in the United States is very competitive. Both supply
and demand sides of the market involve participants from all segments of the industry.
Producers, pipelines, marketers, local distribution companies, and large end users both
buy and sell positions to minimize the costs and risks of natural gas supply. Transactions
are concluded on a bilateral basis between market participants; many of them involve
intermediation by gas marketers. Most natural gas trading takes place in  spot markets
organized by market centers and hubs and facilitated by electronic trading systems.
Physical gas contracts
Natural  gas  is  traded  through  bilateral  gas  contracts  that  specify the  conditions  of
delivery. These contracts have many dimensions that are determined by the conditions of
gas supply, the most important being volume, unit price, calorific value, and location,
time, and duration of delivery. Gas supply contracts differ a great deal in almost all these
dimensions. But the main differentiation in gas contracts is the duration of supply. Three
main types of gas contract have been developed during deregulation: long term, medium
term, and short term.4
Long-term contracts A long-term contract covers deliveries and receipts for more than 18
months.  Such contracts typically specify a fixed quantity  of gas to be  delivered on a
monthly  basis.  They are used  primarily by  firms that  require reliable  and  long-term
commitment  to  natural  gas  supply,  often  to  support  long-term  investment  in  gas
production or transportation facilities.
The prices of long-term gas tend to be flexible and are often indexed to spot and futures
prices of natural gas. If the futures market does not generate reliable price signals for the
duration of a contract, the parties to the contract can agree on variable or fixed reservation
fees  that  recover  the  seller's  costs  of  making  supply  available  in  the  long  term.
Alternatively, the parties can combine physical and financial contracts to create a de facto
"contract for differences" in which they effectively set a floor or cap on price movements
during the life of the contract.
4 The definitions  of gas contracts  in this section  draw  on U.S. Department  of Energy 1994.12
Long-term contracts were commonly used in the U.S. natural gas industry before 1984.
But traditional contractual arrangements created rigidity that later impeded competition in
the  gas market.  Producers, interstate pipelines,  and local  distribution  companies  were
locked into contractual relationships through take-or-pay or minimum obligation clauses
that forced them to pay fixed amounts regardless of delivery. Order No. 436 eliminated
this rigidity by transforming long-term gas supply contracts into long-term transportation
contracts  between pipeline  companies and  their downstream  customers. This  allowed
independent  acquisition  of  natural  gas  by  downstream  customers,  but  left  pipeline
companies with substantial transition costs because of their large uncovered obligations
to  producers.  Until  FERC  allowed  the  distribution  of  these  transition  costs  among
industry  participants,  interstate pipelines  were  hesitant to  implement  the  open  access
regime (box 1).
Box 1 The Transition Costs of Order No. 436: Dismantling  Long-Term Contract Rigidity
Before 1984,  pipeline companies  and  natural  gas producers  concluded  long-term  take-or-pay  contracts  that required
the pipeline  companies  to buy the contracted  volume  of natural  gas or pay a fixed amount  for untaken  volumes.  The
pipeline  companies  in tum transferred  these obligations  to their downstream  customers.  Under  a minimum  payment
obligation  clause,  pipeline  customers  paid a fixed  charge  related  to contracted  capacity  and volume even if they did
not take any delivery.  All participants,  tied by their long-term  contracts,  were unable  to purchase  or sell natural  gas
elsewhere.  This Contract  rigidity became  a substantial  impediment  to implementation  of the open access regime  in
interstate  pipeline  transportation.
The minimum  payment  provisions  gave pipeline  companies  little incentive  to acquire  natural  gas from producers  at
the minimum  cost,  because  they passed  through  producer  prices directly  to their downstream  customers.  Regulatory
distortions  and the oil crisis of the 1970s  contributed  to a dramatic  increase  in producer  prices in the late 1970s  and
early 1980s, leading to  numerous complaints by  consumers. Order No. 380 eliminated minimum payment
obligations in 1984. Order No. 436 allowed pipeline customers  to purchase gas independently  and transformed
long-term supply contracts into long-term transportation  contracts.  Many large customers stopped purchasing
natural  gas from pipeline  companies,  which  were suddenly  left with  large  take-or-pay  obligations  to producers.
The burden  of these take-or-pay  obligations  created substantial  transition  costs for pipeline  companies  and tumed
them against the open access regime.  They were unwilling  to provide  open access  to their pipeline systems  unless
producers  and downstream  customers  took a fair share of the transition  costs. These costs were estimated  at $20
billion  by 1990,  compared  with a total book value  for interstate  pipelines  of $23.8 billion  in 1984  (Pierce 1988). In
1987 Order  No. 500 resolved this issue by allowing  pipeline companies  to transfer up to 75 percent of transition
costs to producers and downstream  customers.  In the end, producers  absorbed  about $10 billion of the transition
costs,  local distribution  companies  $6.5 billion,  and interstate  pipeline  companies  $3.7 billion.
Source:  Pierce 1988  and U.S.  Department  of Energy,  Energy  Information  Administration.
Medium-  and  short-term  Contracts  As  traditional  long-term  contracting  became
impractical in the deregulated gas market, market participants developed contracts with a
shorter duration of gas supply that would give them the flexibility to adjust natural gas
contracting  to  the frequently  changing market  environment. Contractual  flexibility  is
important for least-cost acquisition of natural gas in deregulated gas markets affected by
changes  in  weather,  economic  activity,  availability  of  transportation,  and  the  like.13
Medium- and short-term gas supply contracts have therefore become increasingly popular
among natural gas buyers in the U.S. gas industry.
A  medium-term  gas contract  covers gas delivery  for up  to  18 months,  but  the most
common medium-term contracts are for a year or less. These contracts usually specify the
volume  of  monthly or  daily gas  deliveries, including  allowed variation. The  price  of
natural gas is typically indexed to spot and futures prices, depending on the location of
delivery. Buyers also pay reservation and service fees to the supplier for making natural
gas available for delivery and providing variability in the volumes delivered on a daily or
monthly basis.
Short-term gas  contracts  are frequently traded  in natural  gas spot  markets.  A typical
short-term contract - a spot contract - is for delivery during one calendar month. The
spot contract specifies a fixed price for the natural gas, equal to the prevailing market
price at the time of contract completion. Delivery is for a fixed volume, with consistent
daily  deliveries  over  the calendar  month. Trading  of  a  spot  contract  can take  place
anytime before the delivery month and is terminated about five business days before the
first day of the delivery month.
Contracts  for  less than  one  calendar month are typically used  for balancing.  Market
participants that ship natural gas through the pipeline system are required to maintain a
monthly balance between the volumes they inject and withdraw.  If shippers withdraw
more natural gas than they inject, they purchase the missing gas in the spot market in the
form of a balance contract. Otherwise, they will incur penalties imposed by the pipeline
companies.
A large volume of gas trading in the spot market leads to a need for standardized gas
contracts to  lower transaction costs. Interactions among hundreds of participants in the
spot  market  become  too  complicated  if  the  parties  to  contracts  must  develop  and
formulate  all  contract  dimensions  every  time  they  conclude  a  transaction.  Many
transactions  are concluded rapidly by telephone or over electronic networks,  with the
contracts signed later. If traders cannot trade under commonly accepted standards, they
are hesitant to conclude deals this way. Standardizing contract language, the terms and
conditions of transactions, and the use of contracts should reduce the time and cost of
negotiating and administering contracts.
To promote standardization in the U.S. gas market, industry participants set up the Gas
Industry  Standard Board, a nonprofit organization. The board  cooperates with  FERC,
state public utility commissions, and other industry associations in developing standards
for  operations  in  natural  gas  and  transportation  markets.  Its  efforts  include  the
development of a standardized short-term gas contract (box 2).14
Box 2 Developing  a Standardized  Short-Term  Gas Contract
Numerous  calls from the industry  prompted  efforts by the Gas Industry  Standard  Board  to develop  a standardized
contract for gas sale and purchase.  After a year of drafting  and consultation  with the industry,  the board presented  a
model  short-term  gas purchase  and sale contract  for comments  in 1996.  The model  contract  has three parts:
*  The base contract, containing the names of contract parties and the contract provisions (selected from the
general  terms and conditions  section).
*  General  terms and conditions,  containing  the list of all available  contract  provisions.
*  Transaction confimnation,  specifying the  price, quantity, delivery points, delivery period, and  type  of
transaction  (firm  or interruptible).
The model  contract  should facilitate  transactions  in spot markets,  particularly  on the electronic  data interchange.
Source:  Gas Industry  Standard  Board.
Organization of natural gas trading
The  organization  of  natural  gas  trading  has  changed  dramatically  as  a  result  of
deregulation.  Traditionally  bilateral,  transactions  now  often  involve  intermediation  by
natural  gas marketers  (figure  7).  Marketers  aggregate  the demand  of many  end  users  and
small  local  distribution  companies  and trade  natural  gas on their  behalf,  reducing  the cost
of transactions  in the  natural  gas  market.  The  concentration  of trading  in market  centers
and  hubs  has led to the development  of natural  gas spot markets.  And  the  introduction  of
electronic  information  systems  has promoted  electronic  trading  in these  spot markets.
Figure  4 Organization of Trading in the Wholesale Gas Market
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Bilateral Trading In bilateral trading, the traditional form of natural gas trading, buyers
purchase natural gas directly from producers or other natural gas suppliers. Natural gas is
traded  under  long-,  medium-,  and  short-term  supply  contracts.  Depending  on  the
agreement, one of the parties to a contract arranges transportation of natural gas to the
delivery point. Trading is decentralized, with each buyer and seller shopping around for
the best terms.
Bilateral trading  benefits market participants because it allows them to  complete only
those transactions that suit their needs. Liquid spot and futures markets give price signals
about the market value of natural gas, helping market participants make decisions about
the optimal structure of their contract portfolio. They can combine long-, medium-, and
short-term contracts  in a way that minimizes the acquisition costs for natural  gas and
maximizes the reliability of supply.
But  the  increasing  complexity  of  the  gas  market  reduces  the  efficiency  of  bilateral
transactions.  Bilateral  dealing  segregates supply and demand  into many portions  that
players  seek  to  match  at  the minimum  cost.  Each  market  participant  must  bear  the
transaction costs incurred in searching for the least expensive natural gas or in adjusting
its contract portfolio to the changing market. But some market participants do not have
the ability and the necessary information to complete transactions at the minimum cost.
These participants will be willing to pay a fee for intermediation of transactions that will
give them the desired supply reliability at the minimum cost.
Participants  with  high  consumption  and  load  factors'  tend  to  conclude  bilateral
transactions themselves, because natural gas contracting and pricing is relatively simple.
Low-volume users lack the resources to complete transactions at the minimum cost and
therefore  rely on intermediaries. But  if  markets are very dynamic,  even high-volume
users may find it less expensive to authorize an intermediary to secure gas supplies than
to do it themselves.
Marketing The demand for intermediation of transactions in the gas market has given rise
to  natural  gas marketing  companies, which  complete transactions  on  behalf  of  other
market  participants. Transactions are still bilateral, but  they are completed between  a
marketer  and  other  parties,  such  as producers,  large  end  users, or  local  distribution
companies.  Marketers  aggregate supply and  demand for  natural  gas  and  match  their
clients'  offers and bids at the least cost. Marketers charge a fee for intermediation, but it
must be low enough so that market participants' total cost of gas supply is lower than the
cost of individual gas acquisitions. Otherwise, market participants will not buy marketers'
services.
5 Load factor measures the utilization of pipeline capacity by an end user or shipper. It is calculated as the
ratio of average  daily  throughput  to peak-day  throughput  or the maximum  daily quantity.16
Aggregation of demand and supply allows marketers to diversify the risk of demand and
supply  mismatch.  This  risk  arises  when  market  participants  with  different  demand
characteristics try to match supply and demand individually. Marketers are able to pool
the risks of contracts in one portfolio that gives them flexibility to adjust purchasing or
selling strategies in response to changes in the market. The larger a marketer's  portfolio,
the better able the marketer is to diversify individual supply and demand risks.
Marketing  companies  constitute a dynamic  segment of the  U.S.  natural  gas industry.
Producers, local distribution companies, and large end users have found trading through
marketing  companies  beneficial  because  marketers  offer  both  traditional  gas  supply
services and a large variety of hedging instruments that reduce price and supply risks.
The first marketing companies emerged in the late 1980s, but their numbers surged after
implementation of Order No. 636. Producers, pipeline companies, and local distribution
companies formed marketing subsidiaries that took over natural gas acquisition and sales
from the parent companies. The share of deliveries arranged by marketers increased from
20 percent in 1987 to 49 percent in  1995 (Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Association of
America 1993 and 1996).
The efficiency of trading intermediated by marketers depends on the fees they charge for
services. The  U.S.  gas  marketing  segment  is  very  competitive.  Marketing  fees  and
operations  are liberalized, and the segment is open to entry. Marketing firms  compete
fiercely  for  market  share  and  customers.  The  increasing  complexity  of  natural  gas
markets  has  forced  marketing  companies  to  expand  and  diversify  in  order  to
accommodate  their  clients'  diverse needs.  In  1995 and  1996 the  marketing  segment
experienced  a  wave  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  intended  to  achieve  "operating
economies of scale, superior databases and the ability to offer superior risk management
products" (Energy Online Daily News, February 27, 1996).
The restructuring of gas marketing has increased the market shares of the top competitors.
For example, Chevron Corporation and NGC, the second and sixth largest gas marketers,
merged  in  1996 to  create the  largest marketing company  in  the United  States, with
average daily sales of  10 billion cubic feet. Similar mergers took  place between other
large players, increasing the concentration of sales. While the top 10 marketers arranged
average  daily  sales  of  about  31  billion  cubic  feet,  or  42  percent  of  U.S.  daily
consumption, in  1994, the top four marketers accounted for this volume in  1996 (U.S.
Department  of  Energy  1996). This  market  concentration  leaves  little room  for  small
marketing companies. But small marketers play an important part in local markets, where
they meet  the needs  of local customers that are not  commercially attractive to  major
marketers.
Market Centers and Spot Markets The liberalization of natural gas prices and increasing
flexibility in the natural gas market have promoted the development of market  centers
and hubs. Transactions in the wholesale market have gradually moved from wellheads or
consumption sites to hubs at major interconnections of interstate and intrastate pipelines.
Hubs  were  formed  and  are  typically  operated  by  one  or  several  interstate  pipeline17
companies  that  own  the  pipelines  interconnecting  at  the  hub.  Hubs  allow  market
participants to acquire natural gas from several independent sources and ship it to several
different markets (figure 8). This eliminates the need to contract natural gas and pipeline
capacity  all the way from the wellhead to the consumption site. Instead,  shippers can
combine supply routes across several hubs to diversify supply risks.
Figure 5 Trading in Market Centers and Hubs
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Hubs have become very popular among marketers and other players in the gas market.
Hub operators have gradually increased the scope of hub services from physical transfer
of natural gas to storage, processing, and trading services (box 3). The large variety of
services has led even more shippers to  use hubs for transportation  and acquisition  of
natural  gas.  The  recent  introduction  of  electronic  trading  systems  has  allowed  the
separation of trading from physical infrastructure and led to the development of market
centers connected to one or several hubs by electronic networks, Electronic trading allows
market participants to trade natural gas and pipeline capacity at all interconnected hubs
and pipelines (see U.S. Department of Energy 1996).18
Box 3 Market  Center  and  Hub Services
Market  centers  and market  hubs offer a large  variety  of services.  These are the most commonly  used ones:
Wheeling--Essentially  a transportation  service  in  which  gas is transferred  from one interconnected  pipeline  to
another  through a header (hub),  by displacement  (including  exchanges),  or by physical  transmission  over a market
center pipeline.
Parking-A  short-term  transaction  in  which  the market  center  holds  the shipper's  gas for redelivery  at a later  date.
Often  uses storage  facilities,  but may also use displacement  or variations  in line  pack.
Loaning-A  short-term  advance  of gas to a shipper  by a market  center  that  is repaid  in kind by the shipper  a short
time later. Also  referred  to as advancing,  drafting,  reverse  parking,  and imbalance  resolution.
Storage-Storage  that is longer  than parking,  such as seasonal  storage.  Injection  and withdrawal  operations  may be
separately  charged.
Peaking-Short-term (usually  less  than a day  and perhaps  hourly)  sales of gas  to meet unanticipated  increases  in
demand  or shortages  of gas experienced  by the buyer.
Balancing-A short-term  interruptible  arrangement  to cover  a temporary  imbalance.  The service  is often  provided
in conjunction  with  parking  and loaning.
Gas sales-Sales  of gas that are used mainly  to satisfy  the customer's  anticipated  load requirements  or sales
obligations  to others.  Gas sales are also listed  as a service  for any market  center  that is a transaction  point for
electronic  gas trading.
Title transfer-A  service  in which changes  in ownership  of a specific  gas package  are recorded  by the market
center.  Title  may transfer  several  times for some  gas before it leaves  the center.  The service  is merely  an accounting
or documentation  of title transfers  that  may be done electronically,  by hard copy,  or both.
Electronic  trading-Trading  systems  that either  electronically  match buyers  with sellers  or faciihate  direct
negotiation  for legally  binding  transactions.  A market  center  or other  transaction  point  serves  as the location  where
gas is transferred  from buyer  to seller.  Customers  may connect  with  the hub electronically  to enter  gas nominations,
examine  their account  position,  and access  e-mail  and bulletin  board services.
Adminiistration-Assistance  to shippers  in  the administrative  aspects  of gas transfers,  such as nominations  and
confirmations.
Compression-Provision of compression  as a separate  service.  If compression  is bundled  with  transportation,  it is
not a separate  service.
Risk management-Services that  relate to reducing  the risk of price  changes  to gas buyers and sellers  - for
example,  exchange  of futures  for physicals.
Hub-to-hub  transfers-Arranging  simultaneous  receipt  of a customer's  gas into a connection  associated  with one
center  and an instantaneous  delivery  at a distant  connection  associated  with  another  center.  A form of "exchange"
transaction.
Source:  U.S. Department  of Energy,  Energy  Information  Administration.
The first hub in the United States, the Henry Hub, was established in May 1988 in Erath,
Louisiana  (box 4). Since then, more than 50 hubs have been created across the United
States. The largest hubs are the Henry Hub and the Katy Hub, in Texas. There are also
about 32 market  centers operating in the United States, most located at large hubs in
Texas and Louisiana. One of the most important market centers in consuming regions is
the Ellisburg-Leidy Center in Pennsylvania (U.S. Department of Energy 1996).19
Box 4 The Development  of Hubs and Market  Centers:  The Henry  Hub
The Henry Hub is a major natural gas interchange  center near Erath, Louisianai,  operated by Sabine Pipe Line
Company,  a subsidiary  of Texaco.  Marketers  and traders  at the Henry  Hub have access  to large consumer  markets  in
the Midwest,  Northeast,  Southeast,  and Gulf Coast area through nine interstate  and three intrastate interconnecting
pipelines.
The Henry  Hub became  operational  in 1988  as the first hub of its kind in North America.  The volume transported
through the Hub increased  from 230 million cubic feet of gas a day in 1989 to 550 in 1995, and Sabine has the
capability  to transport  more than 1 billion cubic feet of gas a day across  the hub. Natural gas trading at the Henry
Hub began in 1988  and has developed  over time into a large and liquid spot market. The Henry  Hub became  the
pricing point for the New York Mercantile  Exchange  (NYMEX)  natural  gas futures  contracts  in April 1990 and the
NYMEX  options  contracts  in 1992.
The Henry Hub has attracted  major natural  gas traders  thanks  to Sabine's ability to offer shippers  the flexibility  to
change supply sources and markets  through interconnecting  pipelines.  Sabine's pipeline system is relatively  small,
with only 189 miles of pipeline, but it can move gas in both directions in response to gas prices and has
interconnections  with 14 interstate  and 22 intrastate  pipelines.  Sabine  was the first pipeline  operator  in the U.S. gas
industry to use operational  balance agreements  - agreements  among the interconnected  pipeline companies to
resolve monthly  imbalances  among shippers  so that individual  shippers  do not incur an imbalance  penalty. Sabine
signed such an agreement  with the Natural Gas Pipeline Company  in 1989, and by now has operational  balance
agreements  with all interconnecting  pipelines.  These  agreements  have contributed  to the popularity  of the Henry  Hub
among  gas traders  and the high satisfaction  of shippers  with Sabine's services.
Source:  Interstate  Natural  Gas Pipeline  Association  of America
Spot  markets  have  been  organized  at  almost  all  major  market  centers  and  hubs  in  the
United  States  as well  as at major  city  gates.6 Today  there  are more  than  50  spot  markets
in the United  States.  The most  important  is at the Henry  Hub,  where  natural  gas  has been
traded  since  1988.
The most  important  role  of spot  markets  is to  generate  efficient  price  signals  about  the
market  value  of  natural  gas.  In  a  competitive  spot  market  prices  reflect  the  short-run
marginal  cost  of gas at the  location  of the  market  - that  is, the  spot  price  is equal  to the
value  of  a  marginal  unit  of gas  traded  in  the  spot  market  at  a  particular  time  and  thus
reflects  the  market  value  of gas  at that time.  In practice,  spot  prices  are derived  from  the
prices  of a large  number  of gas contracts  traded  in a spot market.
Market  participants  use spot prices  to evaluate  their  gas contract  portfolios.  They  also  use
spot  prices  for  pricing  natural  gas  traded  under  bilateral  supply  contracts,  particularly
long-term  supply  contracts.  Thus  the  pricing  of  most  natural  gas  deliveries  is  linked  to
spot  market  prices,  and  as  a  result,  most  participants  in  the  gas  market  face  efficient
prices  as long  as spot markets  are competitive  and well  functioning.
6 City gates are delivery points on interstate  pipelines  where local distribution  companies  and large end
users receive interstate gas deliveries. Transportation  beyond a city gate takes place on  interstate or
distribution  pipelines.  City gates are located  near large consuming  areas. In the United States the largest
city gate is in Chicago  (U.S. Department  of Energy 1995a).20
Electronic Trading Electronic trading is a new form of natural gas trading in the United
States.  Electronic  trading  systems  either  electronically  match  buyers  with  sellers  or
facilitate direct negotiations for gas transactions. In the first case market participants post
offers and bids on the electronic system, which matches them anonymously. Transactions
are completed instantly as the system registers all offers and bids that are matched. In the
second case electronic systems identify buyers and sellers and facilitate their transactions.
Since electronic systems are connected to many market centers and pipeline companies,
market  participants can trade natural gas and pipeline capacity in  several locations  at
once. Market participants must purchase access to the electronic system, but they can use
regular computer hardware to support transactions in the system.
Electronic trading reduces transaction costs and promotes efficient pricing of natural gas.
Electronic systems aggregate demand and supply at one point, matching offers and bids at
the  minimum  cost  to  participants  and  generating  systemwide prices  that  reflect  the
opportunity costs of natural gas.
The  beginnings  of  electronic  trading  can  be  traced  to  the  electronic  bulletin  boards
established  by  interstate  pipeline  companies  in  1993  to  support  resale  of  pipeline
capacity.  Standardization  of these  boards  simplified trading  of pipeline  capacity  and
showed the advantages of electronic trading. In  late  1994 three  commercial electronic
trading systems were introduced that allowed market participants to trade natural gas and
pipeline  capacity across several markets and pipelines.  By the  end of  1996 electronic
systems had been introduced by almost all major pipeline companies.
Electronic  systems are now used for trading natural gas, pipeline capacity, and storage
and for communication between pipeline companies and shippers. These systems also are
linked to other commercial networks that supply information and news relevant to the gas
industry. The largest system, Altra Streamline, is linked to eight market centers in the
United States and Canada and 45 electronic bulletin boards of interstate pipelines. The
average daily volume traded in this system ranges from 10 million to 200 million cubic
feet. The second and third largest systems, Channel 4 and Quick Trade, connect four and
three  market centers, respectively,  and a  number of electronic  bulletin boards.  Major
interstate pipeline  companies operate  electronic systems that  give access primarily  to
their own electronic bulletin boards. Small systems integrate with large ones reflecting
the demand  for services that allow trading across all major  gas markets in the United
States (U.S. Department of Energy 1996).
A new role for storage
Natural gas storage has played a significant part in ensuring adequate gas supplies since
the 1930s. Pipeline companies and local distribution companies used storage facilities to
meet  seasonal and  peak gas  demand during  heating  seasons  and to  balance pipeline
operations on a daily basis. The traditional role of storage was to ensure high reliability of
gas supply; cost-effectiveness in storage operations was neglected.21
A new role for gas storage is to promote efficient transactions in the deregulated natural
gas  market.  Storage  operation  is  being  unbundled  from  pipeline  transportation  and
deregulated, and cost-effectiveness is being emphasized. As the unbundling of pipeline
transportation has  improved price discovery at various  points  on the pipeline  system,
storage facilities have increasingly been used to arbitrage locational and time differentials
in gas prices. Storage operators take advantage of swings in spot prices by selling natural
gas at high prices and buying at low prices. These transactions benefit market participants
through greater availability and more efficient pricing of natural gas in the spot market.
Storage also contributes to more productive use of pipeline capacity. Storage facilities are
placed at market hubs and city gates, where storage operators offer a range of services
such  as  storing,  parking,  loaning,  and  balancing natural  gas. 7 Shippers  and  pipeline
companies use these services to balance their shipments and flows of natural gas in the
short, medium, and long term. Storage thus enables pipeline companies to increase load
factor and reduce seasonal load variations. Intelligent use of storage within a system of
hubs can create significant throughput capacity for the transportation grid at a capital cost
of 1 to 2 percent as much as the next cheapest alternative. 8
The  most  common  types  of  underground  storage in  the  United  States  are  depleted
reservoirs in oil or gas fields, salt caverns, and aquifers. A small amount of gas is also
stored in liquefied natural gas and propane-air storage facilities. At the end of 1995 there
were  403  underground  storage facilities  in  operation  in the  United  States, with  total
working capacity of 3.8 trillion cubic feet and daily deliverability (the amount that can be
withdrawn in a day) of 69.3 million cubic feet of natural gas. Depleted oil or gas field
storage accounted for almost 88 percent of working capacity, compared with  10 percent
for aquifers and 2 percent for salt caverns. The share of depleted gas and oil fields in
daily deliverability was 86 percent, that of salt caverns 14 percent and that of aquifiers 10
percent (U.S. Department of Energy 1995c).
The  commercial  success  of  storage  in  deregulated  gas  markets  depends  on  high
deliverability of natural gas to the market rather than on total working capacity. Storage
operators need to be  able to inject and withdraw natural gas quickly to react to highly
volatile spot prices. As a result, salt cavern storage facilities have become increasingly
popular among storage operators in the United States. Because there is no resistance in a
salt cavern, gas can flow into and out of the cavern readily. The operator of an average
salt cavern is able to withdraw all its gas in 10 to 11 days and refill it in only 20 days,
compared  with nearly 60 days to withdraw all  gas from traditional depleted gas  field
storage (U.S. Department of Energy 1995c).
7 Twenty-six  of the 39 market  centers in the United States and Canada offer storage as a major service
(U.S. Department  of Energy 1996).
s Approximately  $0.5 billion  invested  in a system  of hubs with high-deliverability  salt storage  can displace
$40 billion  to $80 billion  of incremental  expansion  in the existing  pipeline  infrastructure  (Bickle 1996).22
Salt  cavern  storage  facilities  are  steadily  gaining  market  share  at  the  expense  of
traditional  storage using depleted gas or oil fields. New storage projects completed  in
1995 added about 47 billion cubic feet of working gas capacity and 1,395 million cubic
feet of daily deliverability to the storage market. Although salt cavern storage facilities
accounted for only about 30 percent of the new capacity, they accounted for 65 percent of
the new daily deliverability.
The location and ownership of salt cavern storage reflect the commercial focus of storage
operators in deregulated gas markets. Most salt cavern storage is in market centers and
hubs. For example, 13 of 19 salt cavern facilities in the Southwest are in market centers.
Independent operators control 50 percent of salt cavern storage facilities, giving them a
12 percent  share  in  daily  deliverability,  though  only  an  8  percent  share  in  working
capacity.
Financial gas market
The opening of the gas industry to competition and the development of natural gas spot
markets have generated price volatility that was absent in the tightly regulated industry of
the past. As industry participants started to look for ways to minimize price risk through
financial instruments, markets responded by offering financial natural gas contracts used
for hedging, speculation, and arbitrage.
There is now a well-developed financial natural gas market. Financial intermediaries and
natural  gas  marketers  offer customized financial  instruments that transfer  risk among
industry  participants.  In  addition, two  organized exchanges offer  several  standardized
natural  gas  futures  and options  contracts used  by traders and  industry  participants  to
minimize  price  risk  in  many  gas  delivery  locations.  These  contracts  have  promoted
efficiency in  the natural  gas industry  as market  participants have taken  advantage of
arbitrage opportunities in locational prices and regional natural gas markets have become
more nationally integrated.
Financial gas contracts
Financial gas contracts are used to manage two types of risk in the natural gas market,
price and basis risk. Price risk is generated by the volatile spot market prices of natural
gas.  Basis risk  is the risk  of change in the price  differential  between locations,  time
periods, and qualities of gas deliveries and between natural gas and other commodities.
Seven major types of financial gas contracts have been developed in the U.S.  financial
gas market, each using a different technique to manage price and basis risk: 9
*  Futures contract - a legal agreement between a party that opens a position on the
futures market to  buy or sell natural  gas and the commodity exchange. The party
9  The definitions  of financial  gas  contracts  draw  on U.S.  Department  of Energy  1994  and NYMEX 1996.23
agrees to  accept or deliver,  during a  specified future month, a  certain quantity  of
natural gas (10 billion British thermal units per contract) meeting quality and delivery
conditions described by the exchange. If delivery takes place,  it occurs during  the
delivery month at a prescribed futures settlement price. Futures contracts are traded
exclusively on regulated exchanges and are settled daily based on their current value
in the marketplace.
*  Forward contract - a supply contract between a buyer and seller under which the
buyer is obligated to take delivery and the seller is obligated to provide delivery of a
fixed amount  of  natural  gas  at a  predetermined price  on  a  specified  future  date.
Payment in full is due at the time of, or following, delivery. A forward contract differs
in this way from a futures contract, under which settlement is made daily, resulting in
partial payments over the life of the contract.
. Swap  - custom-tailored,  individually negotiated  transaction  designed to  manage
financial risk, usually over for 1 to 12 years. Swaps can be conducted directly by two
counterparties or through a third party such as a bank or brokerage house. The writer
of the swap, often a bank or brokerage house, may elect to assume the risk itself or to
manage its market exposure on an exchange. Swap transactions include interest rate
swaps, currency swaps, and price swaps for commodities. In a typical commodity or
price  swap  the  parties  exchange  payments  based  on  changes  in  the  price  of  a
commodity  or  a  market  index,  effectively  fixing  the  price  they  pay  for  the
commodity. Settlements are usually made in cash. Natural gas basis swaps are over-
the-counter agreements to exchange the difference - called the basis - between the
natural  gas futures price on the New York Mercantile Exchange  (NYMEX) and  a
fixed price at a specific location.
Hedge - a position taken in the financial market to offset a position in the physical
market. The expectation is that  gains and losses from price movements  in the two
markets will consistently offset each other until the position in the financial market is
closed (ideally, this occurs at exactly the same time that the position in the physical
market is closed). Thus a hedge is a combination of futures and physical contracts that
effectively fixes the price of natural gas. Long hedges protect the purchase price, and
short hedges the inventory value.
*  Options contract - a contract that gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to
purchase or sell the underlying futures contract at a specified price within a specified
period in exchange for a one-time premium payment. The contract also obligates the
writer, who receives the premium, to meet these obligations.
Exchange offutures for physicals (EFP) - a futures contract that has a delivery point
other than that in a specified second futures contract. The price of the EFP may then
deviate from the price of the specified futures contract. An EFP may be concluded at
any time before the close of the market for the specified futures contract by mutual24
agreement of the two parties holding opposite positions on that contract. The main
reasons  for  trading  EFPs  are  elimination  of  execution risks,  ability  to  choose  a
contractual partner, and flexibility in location and supply conditions.
*  Alternative delivery procedure  - a transaction that takes place after the termination
of trading in a spot month contract, for example, a futures contract. The buyer may
agree with the seller, with whom the buyer has been matched by the exchange, to take
delivery under terms or conditions that differ from the terms and conditions of the
relevant  standardized  contract.  The  exchange  must  receive  notifications  of  such
transactions from the clearing members handling the accounts of the parties to the
transactions.
Financial  gas  contracts  are  divided  into  two  categories:  standardized  and
nonstandardized.  Standardized  contracts,  such  as  natural  gas  futures  and  options
contracts, are offered by and traded in organized exchanges. Nonstandardized contracts
are offered by financial intermediaries or natural gas marketers to market participants on
a caseby-case  basis. Nonstandardized contracts, such as hedges or swaps, tend to vary
widely,  reflecting  the  variation  in  transactions.  They  developed  before  standardized
contracts, as market participants searched for ways to manage price risk in the natural gas
spot market.
Four major types of standardized natural gas futures and options contracts are traded in
the United States. NYMEX offers and provides a trading floor for three of them, each
with a different delivery location. The first futures contract, traded since April  1990, is
for delivery for 1 month to 30 consecutive months, plus the 36th month (though only for
the  June  and  December  contracts,  because these  conclude  the  long-term  contracting
periods), at the Henry Hub. The options contract for delivery at the Henry Hub was added
in April 1992. The Henry Hub futures contract is the most liquid financial gas contract in
the United States. (For the specifications of the NYMEX Henry Hub natural gas futures
and options contracts, see box 5.)
The second futures contract is for delivery in 18 consecutive months at the Permian Basin
in West Texas. This futures contract was introduced on May 31, 1996, and the relevant
options contract was launched seven days later. The third futures contract is for delivery
in Alberta, Canada, and was launched, together with an options contract, in  September
1996.
The fourth natural gas futures and options contracts were issued in  1995 by the Kansas
City Board of Trade (KCBT), which also became a trading spot for these contracts. The
contracts, called Western Natural Gas Futures and Options, are for delivery for up to 18
consecutive months at the Waha-Permian Hub in West Texas.25
Management ofprice  risk
Market participants face substantial price risk in the deregulated natural gas market. Spot
prices  are  volatile,  particularly  during  cold  periods.  Two  spells  of  extremely  low
temperatures  in  late  January  1994 and  February  1996, for  example,  caused  extreme
changes in the spot prices of natural gas at the Henry Hub. While the average spot price
in January  1994 was about $2.25 per million British thermal units, it reached $3.75 on
February 2, 1994, in the midst of the cold spell. Price changes were even more dramatic
in  1995. The average  spot price in  February  1995 was at a record high  of  $4.41 per
million British thermal units, and spot prices peaked above $15 just  before the coldest
weekend, on February 2, 1995.'° The volatility of spot prices increased from the annual
average of about 40 percent to more than 60 percent in February  1994 and almost  140
percent in February 1995 (Natenberg 1996).
Financial  gas  contracts  allow market  participants  to  minimize  this  price  risk  in  the
physical  gas spot market by taking positions  in the financial gas market. The range of
financial contracts  available enables them to  form the positions  in  cash and  financial
markets that best reflect their desired level of risk aversion. Although market participants
use financial contracts for hedging, arbitrage, and speculation, the primary use remains to
minimize price risk.
'0  Prices at city gates were even more volatile than at the Henry Hub. For example, some industrial
customers  in Chicago  paid $45  per million  British  thermal  units to avoid imbalance  penalties  of more than
$60 per million  British  thermal  units (U.S.  Department  of Energy  1996).26
. Box  5S  YE  Diyvision  Henry HubNuralGasFutures  and Op0tions  CnrtSpecifications  0
tRadin mooft~
Futures  andloonD 1  0a0nt  opeoty  i  ehs  tdnc  d  thr  e  NYMts
AC£CESS@  elecronic trading  sseasv frm qpm.  to ".m!, Monday  through  Thurdy All times  are New Yrktms. 
F  vtures  3cnsee  mons  commen  iththntedmo  e  on  October  3, 199,raigoccurs;  o 
0tin all month frmovesmber  199  thvuh'il  2000),  plus  a long-dated  cotrc  initially  liste  36 months out.0
O  ptions: 12 consecutive  months,  plus 18,2430, andt  36 moth  on a Jne-ecmer  cycle. 
Fs:  Dollarandens  per  mtilliont  British  nl  unit,  fo  3prmillion  Britihthermal units. 
Fu,iltures  and qptions:  $0.00  per million  Britihthraluiuts  $0perodntrat).00iEiii0000 
Maximumdaily  price  fluctuation
Futures:  $1.50  per million  British  thermal  units  ($15,000  pe contract)  forthe firsttw months.  Initial  back  month  limits  of
$0.1  5 per mllion  iitish thel  nt  ther￿nas  settlement  price  in
any back  mionth  is at the $0.15  limit. nthevnofa$.5prmlinBishhralui  oeineither  of  he,  first two
contract  monoths,  month  limits  are  raised  to $0.75  per millionBrits thmal units  inall months  from  the liitplace
in  the directibon  offtie  move.
Options:  No price  linits.
Last trdnda
Ftures: Trading  terminates  three  business  days  before  the  first  calendar  d  fthe dlieiro  .
Options:  Trading  terninates  at the  close  of business  on  the businss  da  im  dtyredingtepiration  tf the
underlying  futures  contract.
Exercise  of options
By  a clearing  member  to  the exchange  clearinghouse  not  later  than  5:30  p.m.  or  45 m  s  e  eunderln  I tures
settlement  price  is posted,  whichever  is later,  on any  day  up  to and  including  the optio  iration.
Option  strike  prices
Strike  prices  are  in  increments  of $0.05  per  million  British  tera  units  wit at la  5  ove  i  1  o  theg
at-the-money  strike  prices,  15  in  $0.05  intervals,  and  eight  ab  or  blow th  thet$0.0  incrment  in $5  s Ift
addition,  in tht  three month 
Delivery  - -
SalUine  Pipe  Line Co.'s Henry  Hubi  oiin.Tesle~1eoiil  rhId4Aa  lb~truh~h
buyer,  from- 3te  0ub.  The  hub  fee 
Delivery  peoriod  <
Delivery  shalltae  place no earlier  than the frtclna  a  fh  eieymnheo1*  ecmltdn<~e1xnte
lost calendar  day of the delivery  mnonth.  Alldeirissabemeaanhu1d  lrtoQws
over  the cot4se  hof  h  delivery  mnh  ",<, Alternative  delivery  period
An alternative  delivery  procedure  is available  to buyers  and sellers  who have  been  matched  by the exchange
subsequent  to the termination  of trading-in  the spot  month  contract.  If buyer  and seller  agree  to consummate  dehlvery
under  terms different  from those  prescribed  in the contract  specifications,  they may  proceed  on that basis  after
submitting  a notice of their intention  to the exchange.
Exchange  of futures  for, or in connection  with,  physicals  (EFP)
The commercial  buyer  or seller  may exchange  a futures  position  for  a physical  position  of equal  quantity  by submitting
a notice to the exchange.  EFPs may  be used to either  initiate  or liquidate  a futures  position.
Quality specifidations
Pipeline  specifications  in effect  at time  of delivery.
Position  limits.
12,000  contracts  for all months combined,  but not to exceed  750 in the delivery  month  or 7,500  in any one month.
Margin  requirements
Margins  are required  for open futures  and short options  positions.  The  margin  requirement  for  an options  purchaser





Market  participants  unable  to  accept  price  risk  because  of  technology  or  demand
constraints are willing to pay a premium to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. This
demand can be served by a financial gas contract that transfers the risk to the issuer of the
contract in exchange for a payment. Such price risk management is often intermediated
by natural gas marketing companies or financial intermediaries.
Intermediation of price risk management benefits both marketers and their  contractual
partners.  Marketers  have  lower  risk  aversion  and  better  knowledge  of  markets  and
hedging  strategies  than  most  other participants  in  the  gas  market  and  can therefore
provide better  and less expensive risk hedging. Marketers sell market participants  risk
management  services  in the form  of financial  gas contracts,  at a premium  that reflects  the
risk of the transaction. They then combine the risks of individual financial contracts into
one portfolio and minimize the overall risk by taking positions in physical and financial
gas markets.
Intense  competition  among marketers drives premiums  down toward  the least cost  of
hedging risk. The increasing complexity of the gas market and competition among natural
gas  marketers  have  led  to  consolidation of  the  marketing segment  as  a  number  of
marketing  companies  have  emerged  into  several large  marketing  houses  in  order  to
reduce costs, diversify services in natural gas markets, and expand into the developing28
electric power markets. The critical size of a natural gas marketing firm has increased
from 3 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day in 1994 to 5 billion cubic feet in  1995,
reflecting  the  increase  in  the  size of  the optimal  gas portfolio  for  a  marketing  firm
(Energy Online Daily News, February 27, 1996).
Management of basis risk
The existence of several standardized contracts with different delivery locations signals
the presence of basis risk in the natural gas market - the uncertainty that the cash-futures
differential will widen or narrow during the time a hedge position is implemented and
liquidated."  Basis risk depends on three price relationships:
*  That between the price of a futures contract and the spot price of gas - cash-futures
basis.
*  That between  the  spot price  at the futures  delivery point  and the  spot price  at  a
different  location  - locational  basis.
*  That between the spot price at the futures contract delivery point and the spot price of
a similar but not identical commodity at the same location - intercommodity basis.
Strategies  to  minimize  basis  risk differ with  the type  of basis  risk  involved.  Market
participants manage cash-futures basis risk using alternative delivery procedures, which
allow  them  to  minimize  cash-futures  price  differentials  between the  expiration  of  a
futures  contract and  the  start  of  physical  gas  delivery.  This  period  is  five days  for
NYMEX natural  gas futures and one to three days for KCBT natural gas futures.  Spot
prices can change significantly during this period, leading to a difference between the
value of gas acquired through a futures contract and the market value of gas.
Hedging intercommodity basis risk is a complex operation that differs from case to case.
If commodities are commercially traded, the ability to minimize this type of basis risk
depends on the efficiency of the commodity markets involved. Because heating oil and
natural gas, for example, are substitutes in residential heating, their relative prices should
reflect the  relative  values of heating  equivalent  as long  as the  markets are  efficient.
Market  participants  can minimize  the  intercommodity  risk  between  heating  oil  and
natural gas by taking positions in cash and financial heating oil and gas markets based on
relative price changes. But if qualitative differences in a commodity are not commonly
used in the market - for example, calorific value - hedging tools may not be available.
In this case parties to  supply contracts must  protect themselves by explicitly  defining
delivery conditions and penalties in the contracts.
Locational  basis risk is managed through  exchange of futures  for physicals contracts.
EFPs  allow hedging of  locational basis  risk  for  almost any  delivery  location  on  the
pipeline system in the United States. But the efficiency of hedging by EFPs depends on
the trading volume of EFPs with the same delivery location, which in turn depends on the
" This definition  of basis risk is based on NYMEX's  (1996).29
size of the spot gas market at that  location. EFPs provide effective hedging of locational
basis risk only at the most commonly used locations, such as large market hubs or city
gates.
The division of the U.S. natural gas market into eastern and western parts has increased
the locational basis risk of the NYMEX futures contract with delivery at the Henry Hub.
This contract helps hedge price risk for gas supplies directed to the eastern United States,
but has proved insufficient for hedging price risk for gas supplies going to the western
United  States,  which  originate  in  West  Texas. As  the  locational  price  differentials
between the Henry Hub and West Texas have increased since the introduction of the
Henry Hub futures contract, so has the locational basis risk faced by market participants.
Locational basis risk has also increased because of the growing imports of natural gas
from Canada. Since the price risk in Canada is much different from that in the United
States, price differentials between the Henry Hub and Alberta, Canada, were large and
variable. For this risk too, the Henry Hub futures contract was not an appropriate tool for
hedging.
It was in response to the demand for instruments to hedge the locational basis risk in the
western United States that the Kansas City Board of Trade launched the Western Natural
Gas Futures and  Options contract in August 1995. The contract's  delivery point at the
Waha-Permian Hub in West Texas is better linked with the Western than is the Henry
Hub. The commercial success of this contract shows that shippers to the West viewed the
locational basis risk at the Henry Hub as a serious problem.
The launch by NYMEX in May 1996 of the futures and options contracts with delivery in
Pernian  Basin,  West  Texas,  only  100 miles  from  the  Waha-Permian  Hub,  created
competition  between  the  two  futures  contracts.  The  NYMEX  futures  and  options
contracts with delivery in Alberta, Canada, were launched to serve the needs of customers
that rely on Canadian natural gas imports.
Trading in the  financial gas market
The financial contract market is a dynamic segment of the U.S. natural gas industry. After
the start of futures trading in  1990, the volume of traded natural gas futures  contracts
increased from 0.42 trillion cubic feet in  1991 to 80 trillion cubic feet in 1995, or four
times  more than the end use consumption of natural gas in that year. The turnover in
futures  trading was $125 billion in  1994, about 60 percent more than the turnover in
physical gas sales in that year (U.S. Department of Energy 1994). Most trading is done by
marketers (which held 34 percent of the open interest on natural gas futures in the first
quarter of 1996), producers (25 percent), and financial institutions (20 percent) (NYMEX
1996a). Their shares in previous years were similar. Marketers were also responsible for
60 percent  of the number of futures  traded on NYMEX in  1993 (U.S. Department of
Energy 1994).30
The  financial  gas  market  is  gradually  reaching  maturity,  especially  in  standardized
contracts as indicated by the small share of futures contracts resulting in physical delivery
(table  4).  On  average,  only  0.26  percent  of  natural  gas  futures  contracts  traded  on
NYMEX were held until expiration in  1995, compared with 0.14 percent of crude oil
futures contracts (the most mature contract traded on NYMEX), 0.18 percent of heating
oil futures  contracts,  and  3.4 percent  of propane  futures  contracts. The  low  level  of
physical delivery indicates that market participants use futures contracts as an instrument
for price risk management - their primary purpose - not for physical gas delivery.
Table 4 Delivery Structure of Natural Gas Contracts at NYMEX, 1993-96
(millions of British thermal units)
Deliveries as a
Deliveries of  Futures  percentage of
Year  futures  trading volume  Deliveries of EFPs  trading volume
1993  10,417  3,775,517  79,725  0.28
1994  15,923  6,223,401  147,039  0.26
1995  20,025  7,621,742  209,323  0.26
1996  13,223  4,556,290  142,371  0.29
Source: NYMEX.
Most of the final deliveries of financial gas contracts at NYMEX took place under EFPs,
whose delivery rate is about 10 times that for futures. While futures contracts are used for
hedging  and  speculation  at  only  three  locations  (the  Henry  Hub,  West  Texas,  and
Alberta), EFPs can be used for delivery at any location. Thus EFPs can hedge the risk of
changing price differentials between a standard delivery location and any location in the
nationwide  pipeline  system  and  are naturally  used  more  often than  standard futures
contracts.
The natural  gas market  has become  more efficient with  the increasing  use of futures
contracts. De Vany and Walls (1995) analyzed cointegration between spot and  futures
prices between June  1990 and June 1994 and found evidence that prices in the futures
market  accurately reflected the future spot prices of gas at the Henry Hub and  seven
major  spot  markets.  They  also  found  that  the  price  differentials  between  locations
reflected the costs of transportation. They concluded that the futures prices of a month-
ahead contract revealed the closing futures price, and that spot prices in the Henry Hub
are an unbiased predictor of the future spot price.
Transportation Market
A  natural  gas  transportation  market  is  a  marketplace  where  pipeline  capacity  and
transportation  services are traded. The interstate pipeline transportation  market  is the
most competitive transportation market in the United States because of the unbundling of31
this  industry  segment." 2 The  supply side  of the market  consists  of  interstate pipeline
companies,  and  the  demand  side  of  shippers  that  purchase  pipeline  capacity  and
transportation  from  the  pipeline  companies.  Shippers  are  usually  marketers,  local
distribution  companies, producers,  or large end users. Transactions take place  through
transportation contracts that define the conditions of transportation and delivery of natural
gas.
There are two main transportation markets in the United States: a primary market and a
secondary market. In the primary market pipeline companies sell transportation contracts
to marketers, local distribution companies, or end users. Typical services are firm, no-
notice, and interruptible transportation. In the secondary market pipeline companies and
holders  of  transportation  contracts  resell  unused  capacity  in  the  form  of  firm  or
interruptible  transportation.  The U.S.  interstate  transportation  market  is  regulated  by
FERC.
The unbundling of interstate pipeline transportation and regulatory changes in 1992 have
promoted more transparent and fair pricing of transportation services. Interstate pipeline
companies  began  competing  to  attract  shipments  in  major  markets  by  reducing
transportation prices. Shippers have benefited directly through lower transportation costs,
and end  users indirectly through lower  retail prices for natural  gas.  Shippers paid on
average  16 percent less for interstate pipeline transportation in  1994 than in  1988, while
the  volume  of  transported  natural  gas  increased  by  15  percent  during  1988-94
(transportation costs  are measured  as the  average cost  of  transmission  services  from
wellhead to the local distributor). The transportation and distribution markup decreased
by 20 percent and 42 percent in real terms for industrial end users and electric utilities,
while it remained constant for commercial and residential end users (U.S. Department of
Energy, 1995a).
Structure of the interstate pipeline transportation market
The  interstate  pipeline  transportation  market  is  dominated  by  primary  transportation
services, which were used for 69 percent of gas deliveries in  1995 (table 5). Secondary
transportation services accounted for the remaining 31 percent. The share of secondary
transportation  services  has  been  steadily  increasing  since  the  secondary  market  was
created in 1993.
2 Intrastate  pipeline  transportation  and distribution  are the other  two segments  of the transportation  market
in the United  States.  This section  focuses  primarily  on the interstate  pipeline  transportation  market, which
has experienced  the most radical  regulatory  change  in the past 12 years.  The regulatory  regime  in the other
two segments  varies from state  to state.32
Table 5 Structure of the Interstate Pipeline Transportation Market, 1994-95
(percent)
1994  1995
Primary transportation  71  69
Share arranged by local distribution companies  - 63
Share arranged by marketersa  - 37
Secondary transportation  29  31
Firm  13  17
Interruptible  16  14
Share arranged by local distribution companies  26  24
Share arranged by marketersa  74  76
All transportation  100  100
Share arranged by local distribution companies  - 51
Share arranged by marketersa  49
- Not available
a Includes end users.
Source: Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Association of America.
The most  active players in the primary market are local distribution companies, which
arranged 63 percent of primary deliveries in 1995; marketers and end users arranged the
remaining 37 percent. The ownership of transportation contracts has a similar structure:
local distribution companies held about 66 percent of interstate pipeline capacity in 1995,
marketers  14 percent, end users  8 percent, other pipelines  7 percent,  and producers  3
percent.
Transactions in the secondary transportation market are dominated by marketers, which
arranged transportation for 76 percent of secondary deliveries in 1995. Local distribution
companies'  share was  only 24  percent  and is  steadily  decreasing.  Their share  in  the
overall transportation market is 51 percent, and marketers'  share is 49 percent.
The  open  access  regime  and  unbundling  of  interstate  pipeline  transportation  have
transformed the way in which  end users receive their gas deliveries. Before  1985 they
received almost all natural gas deliveries through sales from local distribution utilities or
a  nearby  pipeline  company.  Today  they purchase  only  52 percent  of  gas  deliveries
directly from pipeline or local distribution companies. They purchase the remaining 48
percent in the wholesale market and pay fees to pipeline and local distribution companies
for transporting these deliveries to consumption sites.
More than 74 percent of deliveries to end users were transported under firm transportation
contracts in 1995, and the remaining 26 percent under interruptible contracts.33
Because  deregulation of  interstate pipeline transportation has  not  given all  end  uisers
equal access to transportation and the wholesale gas market, the structure of deliveries
differs among types of end users. Electric utilities and industrial customers, which gained
the most under open access and unbundling, purchased on average more than 70 percent
of their  1995 natural gas deliveries in the wholesale market and bought  transportation
services from pipeline or local distribution companies. In addition, industrial customers
received  9.5 percent  of their  deliveries directly from interstate pipeline  companies  in
1995 (U.S. Department of Energy 1996). Electric utilities and industrial customers both
took  about  60 percent  of  their deliveries under  firm transportation  contracts,  and  40
percent  under  interruptible  contracts (table  6). Firm  transportation  contracts  offer  the
security of highly reliable delivery of base load natural gas, while interruptible contracts
offer the flexibility to acquire additional gas deliveries in the event of a sudden increase
in  demand. Industrial  consumers  and  electric  utilities purchase  firm and  interruptible
transportation services in different amounts to build a contract portfolio that gives them
the minimum acceptable level of supply reliability at the minimum cost.
Table 6 Firm and Interruptible Deliveries of Natural Gas to U.S. Consumers, 1995
(millions of cubic feet)
Firm  Interruptible
Consumer category  Volume  Percentage of total  Volume  Percentage of total  Total
Residential  4,846,360  34  3,958  0  4,850,318
(99.2)  (0.08)
Commercial  2,650,412  18  380,665  8  3,031,077
(87.4)  (12.6)
Industrial  5,140,048  36  3,439,537  69  8,579,585
(59.9)  (40.1)
Electric Utilities  1,758,945  12  1,147,860  23  2,906,805
(60.5)  (39.5)
Total  14,398,214  100  4,972,245  100  19,370,459
(74.3)  (25.7)
Note:  Figures  in  parentheses  show  the  percentage  breakdown  between  firm  and
interruptible deliveries for that category of consumers.
Source:  U.S. Department  of Energy  1995b.
By  contrast  to  electric  utilities  and  industrial  customers, commercial  and  residential
customers  have  only  limited  access to  the transportation  and  upstream  gas  markets.
Commercial  end  users  took  on  average  23  percent  of  their  gas  deliveries  as  a
transportation service in  1995 and purchased the rest primarily from local distribution
companies  (table  7).  They  took  87  percent  of  deliveries  under  firm  transportation
contracts.  Residential  customers  took  almost  all  their  gas  deliveries  from  local
distribution companies as firm sales services.34
Table 7 Structure  of Natural Gas Deliveries  to U.S. Consumers,  1995
(millions  of cubic feet)
Residential  Commercial  Industrial  Electric  utilities  All categories
Percentage  Percentage  Percentage  Percentage  Percentage
Type of delivery  Volume  of total  Volume  of total  Volume  of total  Volume  of total  Volume  ofttotal
Firm transportation
Sales  4,846,360  99.9  2,125,008  70  1,294,546  15  431,014  15  8,696,928  45
Transportation  0  0  525,404  17  3,845,501  45  1,327,931  46  5,698,836  29
Total  ,  4,846,360  99.9  2,650,412  87  5,140,047  60  1,758,945  61  14,395,764  74
Interruptible
transportation
Sales  3,958  0.1  199,930  7  767,687  9  365,507  13  1,337,082  7
Transportation  0  0  180j735  6  2,671,850  31  782,353  27  3,634,938  19
Total  3,958  0.1  380,665  13  3,439,537  40  1,147,860  39  4,972,020  26
All transportation
Sales  4,850,318  100  2,324,938  77  2,032,233  24  796,521  27  10,034,010  52
Transportation  0  0  706,139  23  6.517,351  76  2,110,284  73  9,333,774  48
Total  4,850,318  100  3,031,077  100  8,579,584  1oo  2,906,805  100  19,367,784  0oo
Source: U.S. Department  of Energy, Energy  Information  Administration.
Primary transportation market
The primary  transportation market  facilitates the  initial  distribution  of  transportation
contracts. Pipeline companies sell transportation contracts to shippers for prices that are
regulated by  FERC. Transportation contracts differ primarily in  the reliability, timing,
and  location  of  natural  gas  delivery.  Shippers  purchase  transportation  contracts  in
combinations that allow them to achieve the desired service reliability at the minimum
cost and to take advantage of time and locational price differentials in the natural gas
market.
FERC  determines transportation charges using the  straight fixed variable rate-making
metnod. Although this method does not yield efficient prices for pipeline transportation,
it  ensures  full  cost  recovery  and  provides  fair  and  transparent  pricing  signals.  But
increasing competition among interstate pipeline companies has prompted a move toward
market-based pricing of transportation services.
Transportation contracts
Deregulation of the U.S. natural gas industry has led to the development of transportation
contracts  that  differ  in  many  dimensions.  The  most  important  and  frequently  used
contract  dimensions  are  reliability  of  transportation  service,  time  and  duration  of
shipment, location of points of injection and withdrawal, pipeline pressure, and charges
for pipeline capacity and transportation services.
The contracts most commonly used in the U.S. natural gas industry  are of  four types
(U.S. Department of Energy 1994):35
*  Firm transportation  contract  - contract that gives  its holder the right  to pipeline
capacity and transportation of natural gas during the entire duration of the contract,
regardless of the season. A firm transportation contract specifies the maximum daily
quantity of gas that can be transported through the pipeline, the points of injection and
withdrawal,  and the charges for reserved capacity and transportation  services. The
holder of a firm contract may use all or part of the reserved capacity, depending on its
needs, but if it exceeds the maximum daily quantity, it will incur a penalty.
*  No-notice firm  transportation contract - contract that gives its holder the right to
pipeline capacity and transportation of natural gas under the conditions specified  in
the contract. The main difference between regular and no-notice firm contracts is that
the holder of a no-notice contract is not required to maintain a daily balance between
nominated  and  delivered  natural  gas  (for  more  information  on  nominating  and
balancing  natural  gas,  see  the  section  below  on  the  optimization  of  pipeline
operation).
*  Limited firm  transportation  contract  - a  contract that  provides  for  limited  firm
service, which is subject to interruption for a specified amount of time each month,
for example, up to 10 days a month. This contract is designed to offer less expensive
firm service to customers that can tolerate greater risk of delivery interruption and is
often used by customers with fuel-switching capability.
*  Interruptible transportation contract - a contract that gives its holder the right to
transport an agreed on volume of natural gas within a certain period. The exact timing
of transportation is determined by the pipeline company according to the availability
of capacity.
Transportation service reliability  These contracts differ primarily in the  reliability  of
transportation services. Firm and no-notice transportation services are the most reliable
because shippers' reserved capacity is available to them at all times. (Firm shipments may
be  interrupted  only  in  extraordinary  supply  situations  caused by  forces  beyond  the
pipeline company's  control.) Limited firm and interruptible transportation services are
less reliable because shippers do not know in advance exactly when an interruption will
occur.
Shippers place a premium on firm transportation contracts because such contracts allow
them to take advantage of  locational price differentials any time they arise. The premium
a shipper is willing to pay depends on the probability of congestion and the size of price
differentials between two spot markets. If local spot prices of natural gas are high because
of congestion in the pipeline system, a shipper with a firm transportation contract can buy
lower-priced natural gas in a neighboring spot market and sell it in the congested local
market. The shipper's  ability to reduce its own cost of natural gas or earn extra profit36
through locational price arbitrage is reflected in the -price of firm transportation services,
which tends to be higher than the price of interruptible services.
Shippers  seldom  need just  one  level  of  reliability  in  transportation  services.  They
typically combine firm and interruptible transportation contracts in  a contract portfolio
that  gives them the minimum acceptable service reliability at the minimum cost.  The
minimum acceptable service reliability for a shipper depends on many factors, such as its
pattern of natural gas consumption, its ability to substitute natural gas for other fuels, and
the structure of its gas contract portfolio. Since shippers have different characteristics,
they form different transportation contract portfolios.
Timing of  service The timing  of transportation  services is an  important dimension  of
transportation contracts because shippers must coordinate transportation with natural gas
supply. The time structure of transportation contracts has been changing with increasing
deregulation of the natural gas market. While traditional long-term supply contracts were
matched  with  long-term transportation contracts, deregulation  of gas markets  and  the
increasing  use  of  short-term  gas  contracts  have  generated  demand  for  short-term
transportation contracts.
Participants in  the deregulated gas market seek the flexibility  to  adjust transportation
contracting to natural gas acquisition in order to minimize the total cost of natural gas.
They look for short-term transportation contracts that will enable them to take advantage
of  swings in  spot prices of natural gas or to react to unexpected shifts in  natural gas
supply and demand. The demand for such contracts has been partially  satisfied by the
introduction of the capacity resale program, but the only satisfactory remedy is a well-
functioning transportation market.
Location of intake and offlake points  Shippers'  ability to choose the location of natural
gas  delivery  is  crucial to  the  efficient  functioning  of  natural  gas  markets.  Shippers
respond to locational differences in the spot prices of natural gas by shipping gas to the
congested market. If they can use any intake or offtake point on a pipeline where they
have reserved capacity, they can eliminate locational price differences along the entire
pipeline, resulting in an efficient market.
Deregulation  of  the  U.S.  gas  markets  introduced  significant  flexibility  in  delivery
locations.  Order No.  636 required pipeline  companies to  offer firm  and  interruptible
shippers a choice in intake and offtake points, based on the priority of locations and the
type of transportation service. It also allowed shippers with available reserved capacity to
divide this  capacity into segments that can be  resold separately in the capacity resale
market. Both measures have contributed to increasing integration of regional natural gas
markets in the United States.37
Regulation of the  primary transportation market
Interstate  pipeline  companies  are  regulated  by  FERC,  which  determines  rates  for
interstate  pipeline  transportation.  FERC  also  establishes  rules  for  the  operation  of
interstate pipeline companies with the aim of promoting the efficient functioning of the
interstate pipeline segment and the wholesale natural gas market.
FERC  determines  tariffs  for  firm and  interruptible  transportation  services  using  the
straight fixed variable rate-making method, a cost-based price mechanism that uses the
average accounting cost pricing concept.' 3 Charges for firm services are divided into a
demand  charge, which recovers most  of the fixed costs of transportation, and a  usage
charge, which recovers variable (or operational) costs. The demand charge is related to
the maximum daily capacity reserved by users, but the greater the reserved capacity, the
lower  the unit charge. Charges for interruptible services range between maximum and
minimum  charges. The  maximum  interruptible  charge recovers  variable  costs  and  a
portion of fixed costs, while the minimum interruptible charge recovers variable  costs
only.
Fixed costs are allocated between firm and interruptible services on the basis of the ratio
of firm to interruptible service loads in the pipeline. The firm load is equal to the total
capacity reserved by firm users. The interruptible load is estimated from  the expected
annual interruptible throughput.
Transportation  charges  are  typically  mileage-based,  that  is,  they  reflect  the  average
accounting costs of capacity and throughput over a unit of distance. This is the notional
path approach to determining charges. Other approaches include zone rates, which  set
charges equal within a particular geographic area, and postal stamp rates which set flat
transportation charges without regard to distance.
Transportation  charges  also  reflect  the  level  of  dLemand  uncertainty.  Firm  service
guarantees  almost  complete  reliability,  so  the  charges for  such  service  do  not  take
demand  uncertainty  into  account.  For  interruptible  service,  pipelines  can  provide
discounts based  on the reliability level, within a  range defined by the maximum  and
minimum interruptible charges.
Transportation charges on newly constructed pipelines are also regulated by FERC. It
uses two pricing principles: roll-in rates and incremental rates. If a pipeline company can
prove that capacity expansion benefits most of its existing customers, it can "roll in" a
portion of the costs of new capacity to all pipeline customers as long as the price increase
13  The straight fixed variable rate-making method replaced the modified fixed variable rate-making
method,  which allowed  the recovery  of certain  fixed costs,  including  a return on equity  and related  taxes,
through a volumetric  charge.  The change in method  in 1992 led to an increase in the unit cost of natural
gas for low-load-factor  customers  and a decline in unit cost for high-load-factor  customers. For more
details,  see U.S.  Department  of Energy 1995a.38
is no more than 5 percenit.  If these conditions are not satisfied, the company must  use
incremental rates that assign the costs of a capacity expansion to the users of the new
pipeline (U.S. Department of Energy 1995a).
An evaluation of the straight fixed  variable rate-making method The main benefit of the
current regulation of transportation charges is that  it ensures full recovery of pipeline
companies'  costs. Other benefits are the transparency and fairness of transportation rates.
Pipeline  companies  regularly  report  their  costs  and  revenues  to  FERC,  which  can
determine  rates  through  a  relatively  simple  calculation.  All  parties  involved  in
transportation can check the results and the methodology. And because all transportation
rates  are  determined  using  the  same  methodology,  shippers  can  compare  pipeline
companies'  rates and select the lowest-priced service.
But the economic efficiency of the current price regulation is compromised by FERC's
goal of ensuring cost recovery and preventing the exercise of market power exercise by
the  pipeline companies. The main  source of inefficiency  is the  arbitrary allocation  of
fixed costs under the average accounting cost pricing concept. The straight fixed variable
rate-making method neglects several factors that are important for efficient pricing of
transportation: the price and reliability elasticity of demand for transportation services,
the  marginal  cost  of  capacity  and  throughput,  and  demand  and  supply  uncertainty.
Because shippers do not pay the actual costs incurred in transporting their shipments,
they may make  suboptimal decisions about purchasing transportation  and natural  gas
contracts, distorting the allocation of resources in the natural gas industry.
The rate-making  method does not  give pipeline companies flexibility  to  charge  rates
based  on  demand.  With  shippers  increasingly  using  short-term  firm  transportation
contracts purchased in the secondary market, the inability to charge demand-based rates
threatens  full  cost  recovery. Many  low-load-factor shippers  find  it too  expensive  to
purchase firm transportation contracts at prices determined on the basis of a 1  00 percent
load factor. So they purchase firm contracts for relatively small volumes from pipeline
companies and rely on interruptible transportation and the secondary capacity market for
additional transportation services needed.
Shippers also are reluctant to enter into long-term transportation contracts because they
do not know their market value. Instead, they prefer to purchase short-termn  transportation
contracts, whose market value is revealed in the secondary transportation market.  But,
short-term  contracting for transportation services creates high  revenue uncertainty  for
pipeline companies.' 4
1  Shippers' unwillingness  to sign long-term transportation  contracts  has created serious problems for
interstate  pipeline companies  in the United States.  Long-term  contracts  for about 50 percent of available
pipeline  capacity  will expire  by 2002.  Although  experts  expect that about 75 percent of that capacity  will
be recontracted,  pipeline companies  will not be able to sell long-term contracts  in regions or pipeline
corridors  with excess  capacity. This will expose  them to substantial  revenue  risk unless regulation  gives
them the flexibility  to use price  discrimination  (McDonnald  1996).39
New regulatory measures adopted by FERC FERC has recognized the problems faced by
pipeline companies and shippers in the primary transportation market and adopted several
measures  that  expose  the  interstate  pipeline  segment  to  market  forces.  One  of  the
measures  allows  pipeline  companies  to  offer  discount  rate  plans,  such  as  seasonal,
volumetric,  or  multipart  rates,  to  low-load  shippers.' 5 These plans  help  improve  the
situation, but they neglect the main source of the problems - the arbitrary allocation of
fixed costs under the straight fixed variable rate-making method.
The most important measure has been the establishment of three alternative mechanisms
for  rate  determination  (FERC  1996a  and  1996b).  These  mechanisms  give  pipeline
companies the flexibility to customize their rate structures if they can demonstrate that
they do not have market power.
*  Market-based rates. This mechanism allows pipeline companies to  charge market-
based rates if they do not have market power (the ability to maintain  a  10 percent
price increase without losing market share) and if they have a Herfindahl-Hirschman
index  of  less  than  1,800  (the  Herfindahl-Hirschman  index  measures  market
concentration for the purposes of an antitrust analysis). Market-based rates are applied
case by case.
*  Incentive rates.  This mechanism establishes performance criteria that give pipeline
companies an incentive to charge optimal rates even if they have market power. Rates
are not cost-based, and no price caps are applied. The efficiency gains are shared by
consumers and pipeline companies. The adoption of incentive rates is voluntary.
*  Negotiated  rates  with recourse to  a default  rate.  Negotiated rates are determined
through mutual agreement between a pipeline company and shippers, while recourse
rates  are  based  on  cost  of  service.  Shippers  have  access to  both  rates. Pipeline
companies  are required to  allocate capacity to recourse  shippers during constraint
periods, but these shippers will not be solely responsible for the cost of unsubscribed
capacity.
The response of the pipeline companies to the proposed rate-making mechanisms  has
been favorable.  Most of  the pipelines  favor the  mechanism of  negotiated  rates with
recourse because it gives them both the certainty of cost recovery under recourse rates
and price flexibility under negotiated rates. By October 1, 1996, 13 pipeline companies
had filed for approval to use this mechanism. Most of these filings have been approved by
FERC (U.S. Department of Energy 1996).
" Seasonal  rate-making  allows  pipeline  companies  to set capacity  reservation  charges  for peak  and off-
peak seasons. Volumetric  rate-making  results in a one-part  tariff based on the volume of gas delivered.
This rate is used mainly  by small-volume,  low-load-factor  customers.  Finally,  pipelines  can use a two-part
rate that consists of capacity reservation  and usage charges, but allocates  fixed costs between the two
components  (U.S. Department  of Energy  1994).40
Secondary transportation market
A  secondary transportation  market  is  a  marketplace where  holders  of transportation
contracts can resell temporarily or permanently unused capacity to other shippers. The
first secondary transportation market in the United States, known as the capacity release
program,  was  created  by  Order No.  636 in  1993. Under this  program  shippers  can
purchase transportation contracts from other shippers through a bilateral transaction or an
auction. Another secondary transportation market is the gray market, in which shippers
use spare capacity to ship natural gas to congested markets.
Capacity release program
The capacity release program established rules for trading firn  capacity contracts owned
by shippers. Holders of firm transportation or storage contracts can resell them to other
parties through a pre-arranged deal or an open bid (U.S. Department of Energy 1995a).
The current holder of a firm capacity contract (the releasing shipper) makes a prearranged
deal with the interested party (the replacement shipper) if the capacity release price is
equal to the maximum firm rate of the pipeline or if the duration of the contract does not
exceed one calendar month. Prearranged deals are concluded bilaterally, through mutual
agreement on the conditions of the released capacity contract. Once a prearranged deal is
concluded, the details are posted on the pipeline's  electronic bulletin board, including the
rate charged, the type of charge, the amount of capacity, and the duration of the release
(U.S. Department of Energy 199a).
If  neither  of  the  conditions  above are  met,  the  releasing  shipper  posts  the released
capacity along with  corresponding conditions in  advance  on the pipeline's  electronic
bulletin board.  Shippers bid  for the contract in  an  auction,  and the highest bidder  is
awarded the contract. The winning bid price  thus becomes the replacement shipper's
demand charge. If the bid  price is less than the demand charge stated in the  contract
between  the  releasing  shipper  and  the  pipeline, the  releasing  shipper  must  pay  the
difference. If the bid price exceeds the releasing shipper's demand charge, the releasing
shipper keeps the difference. The replacement shipper then negotiates the conditions of
transportation services with the pipeline (Herbert 1996b and FERC 1992). Details of the
capacity release contract are posted on the electronic bulletin board.
The prices of transportation contracts traded in the capacity release market are regulated
by FERC, using the price cap method. The price of released capacity cannot exceed the
maximum firm transportation rate of the pipeline company that owns the pipeline system
in which the capacity was released.
Activity  under the capacity release program  The capacity release program has  grown
dramatically  since its  start in  November  1993. More  than  3.2 trillion  cubic  feet  of
pipeline capacity was released in the 12 months ending March 31, 1995, and about 5.841
trillion cubic feet, or 59 percent more, was released in the next 12 months. This capacity
represented about 15 percent of the total end use consumption of natural gas in 1994 and
30 percent in 1995. More capacity is released in the nonheating season than in the heating
season. In the 1995 nonheating season 3.3 trillion cubic feet of capacity was released, and
in the 1995-96 heating season about 2.4 trillion cubic feet of capacity was released.
The  prices  for  capacity have been  well below the  price  cap, but  they  are  gradually
increasing.  The average rate for released capacity was discounted 65 percent from the
maximum transportation rate during the 1995-96 heating season and 83 percent during
the 1995 nonheating season. These rates reflect a substantial increase from the 82 percent
discount  in  the  1994-95  heating  season  and  the  92  percent  discount  in  the  1994
nonheating  season. On average, released capacity seems to be an inexpensive substitute
for primary transportation contracts.
An  evaluation  of  the  capacity  release program  The  capacity  release  program  is
potentially an effective tool for promoting efficient allocation of pipeline capacity among
shippers.  Since shippers are allowed  to trade  unused capacity  among themselves,  no
unused capacity should be left after the market clears. Shippers that value capacity the
most buy it from shippers that value it little because they do not intend to use it. Shippers
sell capacity for a price that reflects its opportunity cost and makes both buyer and seller
better off. The allocation of capacity among shippers on the basis of their willingness to
pay should lead to efficient allocation of resources and greater utilization of pipelines.
One of the most important conditions for the efficient allocation of capacity, however, is
market  pricing.  Since  capacity  release  is  increasingly used  for  resale  of  short-term
capacity,"  the price of released capacity should follow the short-run marginal cost  of
capacity, falling in off-peak periods and rising in peak periods to reflect changes in the
opportunity cost.
But the price cap imposed by FERC, which prevents the market price of released capacity
from exceeding the maximum firm rate, leads to distorted  prices and thus  inefficient
allocation of capacity. Shippers unable to obtain market value for their unused capacity
will be unwilling to sell it through the capacity release program. IThe  distorted prices for
the  transactions that  do take  place  give buying  shippers inefficient  signals  about the
market value of released capacity and attract more than the efficient level of demand.
The price cap allows efficient pricing of released capacity only in off-peak periods, when
pipeline systems are not congested. In these periods the opportunity cost of capacity is
well below the price cap, and shippers pay a price determined by the market. Since the
16 About 90 percent of capacity  released since the start of the program on November 1, 1993, became
available  to shippers within two weeks from the date of contract award. And more than 70 percent of
released capacity in the 1995-96  heating season was under contracts  for terms of 31 days or less (U.S.
Department  of Energy 1996).42
capacity resale market  is relatively  competitive,"  particularly  on  major transportation
routes, capacity prices in off-peak periods are relatively efficient and promote efficient
allocation.
The relatively low average price of released capacity has made the price cap nonbinding
on average. But because the price of released capacity cannot exceed the price cap and
because prices are low in off-peak periods, the average price necessarily is less than the
price cap. The explanation may also be that there is an abundance of pipeline capacity or
that capacity resale in peak periods takes place outside the capacity release program. The
existence of the gray market suggests that the second is true.
Another  problem, particularly  in  the  resale of  short-term  firm contracts,  is  the  high
transaction costs of capacity resale. Shippers require flexibility in contracting in order to
be  able to react  quickly to  changes in the market. The auctioning of capacity, which
requires posting and bidding, does not provide the required flexibility. Shippers must go
through  several  (sometimes  incompatible)  electronic  bulletin  boards  to  acquire
information  about  available  capacity  and  complete  transactions  with  other  shippers.
These  problems  have  led  shippers  to  resell  firm  contracts  mainly  through  bilateral
prearranged deals. Under Order No. 577, prearranged capacity release deals with a term
of  up  to  one  calendar  month  are  exempt  from  the  advance  posting  and  bidding
requirements.
FERC has also taken other measures to address problems in the capacity release program.
It has pushed the industry to standardize electronic bulletin boards and capacity release
procedures to reduce the transaction costs of capacity resale. In 1996 it issued Order No.
587 requiring  all pipeline companies to  establish  procedures to  speed the  process  of
capacity release. And most recently, it proposed removing price caps on released capacity
if the releasing shippers can demonstrate that they do not exercise market power. This
proposal is being studied by the industry.
Gray market
The  gray market  represents a market  solution to  the distortive regulation  of  capacity
release prices. The market facilitates the trading of pipeline capacity bundled with natural
gas and sold in congested markets. Shippers with firm capacity rights can earn the market
value for their temporarily or permanently available capacity by using it to ship natural
gas to congested markets. Since the price of natural gas is not regulated, shippers can
charge the price that maximizes their profits.
The evolution of the gray market can be traced to the period before Order No. 636, which
allowed the resale of  transportation contracts. Local  distribution  companies, the  most
frequent holders of firm capacity, used their temporarily available capacity to ship natural
17 On average, shippers can potentially  obtain capacity from 70 holders of firm contracts on  a given
pipeline  (De Vany  and Walls 1993).43
gas to city gates on behalf of third parties, charging them regulated prices, under "buy-
sell"  contracts.  Order No. 636 prohibited new buy-sell contracting but did  not abolish
existing  contracts,  even  after  deregulation  of  natural  gas  prices.  This  allowed  local
distribution companies to continue shipping natural gas to city gates on behalf of third
parties and, more important, selling it for unregulated prices (Marston 1994).
Despite the attractiveness  of unregulated market  pricing, the gray market  is  neither  a
substitute for capacity release nor an efficient market for pipeline capacity. Gray market
prices  barely  reflect  the  system  marginal costs  of  natural  gas  and  pipeline  capacity
because  trading  is  thin  compared  with  activity  in  the  overall  natural  gas  market.
Transaction  costs  are  relatively  high,  because  there  is  a  lack  of  information  about
available capacity, market prices, and the like. Buyers also face the monopoly power of
sellers that control bottleneck capacity. So the gray market is beneficial because it allows
transactions that otherwise would not occur, but it suffers from high transaction costs and
monopoly power.
FERC  will have to address these problems in order to  optimize secondary trading and
allocation  of  pipeline  capacity.  Its  recent  measures to  simplify  the  capacity  release
program  and  allow  market  pricing  of  released  capacity  in  competitive  markets  will
certainly attract some gray market players to the capacity release program. But the gray
market will probably continue to exist until regulated prices for released capacity become
nonbinding.44
Optimization  of Pipeline  Operation  in the Unbundled  Natural  Gas Industry
Transactions  in  a  deregulated  natural  gas  industry  must  be  coordinated  to  achieve
simultaneous  clearing of natural gas  and transportation markets at the minimum  total
cost. Market participants in the U.S. natural gas industry match the available supply of
natural gas and transportation contracts with their demand through decentralized bilateral
transactions.  Each  market  participant  minimizes  its  own  costs  of  natural  gas  and
transportation. But the total costs of natural gas to end users may not be minimized  if
transportation is inefficient because of suboptimal operation of pipelines.
An  interstate  pipeline  company in the United  States faces  demand for  transportation
services that consists of the demand of many individual shippers. The utilization of its
pipeline  capacity  varies  because  of  the  frequently  changing  volume  of  individual
shipments.  To  maximize  the  utilization  of pipelines  and  minimize  the  total  cost  of
transportation, a pipeline company uses its available capacity for interruptible services.
As a result, a typical pipeline is used by several shippers at once. Since the load for one
shipper  is  dependent  on  the  loads  of  others,  an  action  by  one  shipper  can  impose
substantial costs on the others and on the entire pipeline system. To minimize the total
cost of pipeline transportation, all shippers must therefore obey a set of common rules
that coordinate shipments in the pipeline system.
Optimal pipeline operation is achieved through scheduling, balancing, central dispatch,
and emergency control of gas flows in the pipeline system. Scheduling and balancing are
means to coordinate natural gas supply with transportation services. A pipeline company
carries out these activities by acquiring information about the volumes of gas and the
pipeline capacity demanded by shippers, then determining the flow of shipments through
the pipeline system that minimizes transportation costs and satisfies shippers'  demands.
Central  dispatch and emergency control maintain system balance and  guide gas flows
through the pipeline system in real time.
Scheduling  and balancing
Scheduling is the process of determining of the optimal flow schedule - the order and
direction of gas flows in the pipeline system that minimize the total cost of transportation.
Balancing is the process of maintaining and restoring the balance of the pipeline system
(system balance) and individual shipments (shipper's balance).
Pipeline  companies  determine the optimal flow  schedule based  on  information about
demand for transportation services. Scheduling and balancing can be broken down into
the following stages:
*  Shippers "nominate"  daily volumes of natural gas to be delivered, received, or stored
by the pipeline company on the upcoming gas day (a period of 24 hours that is used in
pipeline transportation). Nominations must be submitted in writing or electronically45
by a certain time on the day preceding the gas day. Shippers also nominate capacity at
specific intake or offtake points. Nominations of daily volumes can be renewed or
changed on a monthly basis and may specify any quantity up to the maximum daily
quantity specified in the transportation contract.
*  A pipeline  company aggregates the  gas and  capacity nominations  and  determines
whether the pipeline system can match the total nominated capacity and gas volumes.
Then it confirms the nominations or asks for adjustments.
*  The pipeline deterrnines the schedule of all gas flows into and out of each receipt and
delivery point. The flows are scheduled according to priorities determined by the type
of transportation contracts involved.
*  Shippers inject or withdraw natural gas and are responsible for keeping the difference
between actual and nominated gas volumes within the agreed on tolerance levels (5 to
10 percent of nominated volume, but  flows should not  exceed the maximum daily
quantity). Balancing is performed both daily and monthly. Negative imbalances  -
those occurring when a shipper withdraws more gas than it injects - are subject to
penalties.
The balancing of natural gas flows is aided by the following tools and services:
*  Operational  balance  agreements.  Under  an  operational  balance  agreement,  the
operators of interconnecting pipelines  resolve monthly imbalances among multiple
shippers,  so  that  individual  shippers  do  not  incur  an  imbalance  penalty.  Such
agreements promote the integration of pipeline systems because they allow pipeline
companies  to  settle  imbalances  with  other  connecting  pipeline  or  distribution
companies rather than with each customer.
*  Overrun authorizations. An overrun authorization allows a shipper to transport more
than the maximum daily quantity  of natural gas,  subject to  prior  approval  by the
pipeline company.
*  Penalties. Penalties are used to  discourage shippers from running  an imbalance  in
their shipments. There are three types of penalties:" 8
*  Scheduling variance penalties - incurred when the daily flow of natural gas
does not match the nominated flow.
*  Overrun penalties - incurred when the shipper's maximum daily quantity is
exceeded.
*  Imbalance  penalties  - incurred when  the total  monthly  receipts  into  the
pipeline do not match the total monthly deliveries to the shipper.
*  Market center services
IS For more information  on penalties,  see U.S. Department  of Energy  1994.46
*  No-notice service. Under no-notice service, a shipper  may exceed  its daily
nomination without incurring scheduling penalties, but it must not exceed the
maximum daily quantity.
*  Lending  and  parking  services. Lending  is  a  short-term  storage service  to
deliver natural gas to a shipper when it needs more than its nominated volume.
Parking  is  short-term  storage  for  a  shipper  when  it  needs  less  than  its
nominated volume.
*  Wheeling service. Wheeling gives customers the ability to change a delivery
point by arranging delivery to an alternative location.
Gas flow control in real time
Pipeline  companies  must  have the  ability to  control and  direct  flows of natural  gas
through the pipeline system in real time in order to maintain system balance in the event
of an unexpected disruption of gas flows. There are three major tools for controlling and
directing natural gas flows:
*  Central dispatch. Central dispatch directs flows of natural gas through the pipeline
system according to a predetermined flow schedule and an emergency plan. Central
dispatch is performed by a pipeline's gas control unit, which has electronic devices to
monitor and control the direction of flows and the volume and pressure in the pipeline
system and interconnected storage facilities.
*  Operational flow  orders. These are emergency orders issued by pipeline companies
that require shippers to  inject or withdraw natural gas at a specific point to ensure
continued flow of natural gas through the system. Operational flow orders are used
only in emergencies, and shippers must be notified several hours before such an order
is implemented.
*  Curtailments. Under curtailments, pipeline companies may cut off transportation  or
storage  service to  shippers in  the event of a  major supply or  capacity disruption.
Curtailments are used primarily in the most severe emergencies. A priority order for
curtailments  is determined by  a  pipeline company  and  approved by  FERC.  Firm
transportation is the last service disconnected.
Conclusion
Deregulation of the U.S. natural gas industry has shown that market forces can result in
efficient transactions in industry segments traditionally considered natural monopolies.
The  main  goal of deregulation was to  create competitive markets  in natural  gas  and
pipeline  transportation,  in  the  expectation  that  competition  would  guide  individual
transactions toward the socially optimal outcome.47
The achievements  of the  U.S.  gas  industry  in the  past  15 years  confirm the  overall
direction  of  deregulation.  The  United  States  enjoys  a  highly  competitive  wholesale
natural gas market and an increasingly competitive interstate transportation market. Both
markets have benefited from deregulation of natural gas production and marketing and
liberalization  of natural  gas prices. And  the introduction of  open  access to  interstate
pipelines and their unbundling from gas sales have allowed end users to participate in the
efficiency gains in upstream markets. All this has contributed to declining retail prices for
all major consumer categories.
But  deregulation  is  far  from  complete. The  current  regulation  of  interstate  pipeline
companies and the secondary transportation market does not promote efficient allocation
of  transportation  contracts.  Flexible  pricing  of  transportation  contracts  should  be
introduced in both the primary and the secondary transportation market. But deregulation
of retail markets remains the most important task and the biggest challenge for industry
regulators.  Small-volume end  users, such as residential or  commercial customers, are
captive to  local distribution utilities and cannot access competitive wholesale markets.
All end users should be able to choose a natural gas supplier and receive natural gas at the
minimum cost to society.48
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